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JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES Vol. 46, Issue 2 (Fall 2007) 
 
Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters 
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.∗
 
Confusion often accompanies contemporary discussion of questions 
related to Catholic participation in public life.1  It does so, in part, because 
participants in such discussions often fail to recognize that Catholics participate 
in public life in different ways that give them different sorts of roles.  There are 
Catholic legislators and executive officials, there are Catholic voters, there are 
Catholic judges, and, within the judicial branch, there are trial judges and 
appellate judges, working in both state courts and federal courts. 
All Catholics involved in public life – whether as judges, legislators or 
voters – have a moral obligation to promote the common good through their 
participation in public life.2  But I do not believe we can coherently talk about the 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.  LL.M. 2003, Columbia Law School; J.D. 1988, 
Michigan Law School; S.T.L. 2002, M.Div. 2001, Weston Jesuit School of Theology; A.B. 1985, 
Georgetown University.  This Essay is a revised version of the Jesuit Partnership Lecture delivered at 
Marquette University on August 30, 3006 and a presentation given at St. Michael’s College, Colchester, 
Vermont, on November 2, 2006.  I am grateful for the helpful comments about this Essay that I received 
during a faculty colloquium at the Notre Dame Law School. 
1 See, e.g., James L. Heft, S.M., US Catholics and the Presidential Election: Abortion and Proportionate 
Reasons, 86 NEW BLACKFRIARS 259, 259 (2005) (“A Jesuit, who is also a moral philosopher, recently 
remarked, ‘I have never before encountered … such intense concern and confusion over faith and politics 
as I do nowadays.’”) (quoting John F. Kavanaugh, S.J., Catholic Consciences, AMERICA 7 (July 19-26, 
2004)). 
2 See, e.g., John Paul II, Christifideles Laici (On the Vocation and the Mission of the Lay Faithful in the 
Church and in the World) #42 (1988), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-
ii_exh_30121988_christifideles-laici_en.html (“In order to achieve their task directed to the Christian 
animation of the temporal order, in the sense of serving persons and society, the lay faithful are never to 
relinquish their participation in ‘public life’, that is, in the many different economic, social, legislative, 
administrative and cultural areas, which are intended to promote organically and institutionally the common 
good.… [E]very person has a right and a duty to participate in public life, albeit in a diversity and 
complementarity of forms, levels, tasks and responsibilities.”); Administrative Committee of the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility 7-8 
(2003); see also Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis #83, 36 ORIGINS 629, 652 (2007) (“[A] public 
witness to our faith” is called for from “all the baptized, yet it is especially incumbent upon those who, by 
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questions sometimes raised about Catholic participation in public life without 
recognizing that the different roles played by Catholic public officials call them 
to make a range of distinct sorts of decisions.  These different sorts of decisions 
give rise to complex sets of moral questions, which cannot be answered with a 
general, sound-bite response.  In this Essay, I will try to bring some clarity to the 
confusion by focusing attention on one public role played by Catholics, that of 
the judge.  Along the way, I hope also to shed some light on the questions raised 
by the different public roles played by legislators and voters. 
The media focused attention on the question of the role of the Catholic 
judge in the wake of the appointment of two Catholics, John Roberts and Samuel 
Alito, to the U.S. Supreme Court.  A lively discussion of the Catholic faith of 
Chief Justice John Roberts erupted shortly after then-Judge Roberts’ nomination 
to the Court.  The controversy was sparked by a Los Angeles Times column by 
Professor Jonathon Turley of the George Washington University Law School.  
The column described a conversation that took place between Judge Roberts and 
another Catholic public official, Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois.  Senator 
                                                                                                                                                 
virtue of their social or political position, must make decisions regarding fundamental values such as … the 
promotion of the common good in all its forms.”).  As David Hollenbach, S.J., has noted, the concept of the 
common good is unfamiliar – perhaps “nearly incomprehensible” – to many Americans today.  David 
Hollenbach, S.J., THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS xiii (2002).  The concept of the common 
good must not be conflated with “the largely economic and utilitarian concept of the general 
welfare.…[T]his kind of utilitarian standard pays little or no attention to how [the] overall sum [of 
economic welfare] is distributed among the members of society.”  Id. at 7.  In contrast, the common good 
“embraces the sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve 
their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way.”  Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 284 (Walter M. Abbot, S.J., gen. ed., 1966); see also 
John Paul II, Christifideles Laici, supra note 2, at #42 (“Public life on behalf of the person and society finds 
its basic standard in the pursuit of the common good, as the good of everyone and as the good of each 
person taken as a whole….”).  
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Durbin is said to have asked Judge Roberts the following question: “what would 
[you] do if the law required a ruling that [the Catholic] church considers 
immoral?”  Professor Turley described Judge Roberts’ response in these words: 
“Renowned for his unflappable style in oral argument, Roberts appeared 
nonplused and, according to sources in the meeting, answered after a long pause 
that he would probably have to recuse himself.” 3
 Turley went on to characterize Roberts’ response as “the wrong answer” 
to Durbin’s question.  The answer was wrong, Turley explained, because “[i]n 
taking office, a justice takes an oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States.  A judge’s personal religious views should have no role in the 
interpretation of the laws.”4  Turley gave Roberts credit for not saying that his 
faith would control his legal judgment in the sort of case Durbin proposed, but 
he did express the fear that, “if [Roberts’] were to recuse himself on such issues 
as abortion and the death penalty, it would raise the specter of an evenly split 
Supreme Court on some of the nation’s most important cases.”5  While Senator 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Turley, The Faith of John Roberts, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at B11.  
4 Id.  The proper role that religious values should play in judicial decision making (i.e., the proper role that 
religious values should play in the process by which a judge comes to decide what the law actually means 
and demands in a given case) is a question beyond the scope of this Essay.  Indeed, it is a question that is 
significantly different than the question that Durbin actually asked Roberts.  Durbin’s exchange with 
Roberts is really concerned with the following question: what should a morally conscientious judge do 
when the law as the judge interprets it is truly unjust and the action that the law requires of the judge in a 
given case is truly in conflict with the conscientious convictions of the judge?  Many scholars have 
considered the distinct question of the role that religious values should play in judicial decision making.  
See, e.g., Teresa S. Collett, “The King’s Good Servant, but God’s First”: The Role of Religion in Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537 (1998); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 102-04 (1997); id. at 155 n. 141 (citing a range of scholarship 
discussing the issue); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 141-50 (1995). 
5 Turley, supra note 3. 
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Durbin’s office has disputed the accuracy of Turley’s description of the 
conversation,6 Turley’s account of Durbin’s question and Roberts’ response 
fueled debate across the political spectrum about the proper relationship 
between Roberts’ faith and judicial decision making in the weeks leading up to 
the Roberts confirmation hearing. 
John Roberts is now Chief Justice of the United States, and, with the 
addition of Samuel Alito to the Court, there is now, for the first time in U.S. 
history, a Catholic majority on the Supreme Court.  Five of the currently sitting 
justices – Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, along with Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas – are Roman Catholics.  Because the 
Church offers moral teaching with respect to many issues that are likely to come 
before the Court, it makes sense to think carefully about the issues raised by 
Professor Turley. 
But contrary to the position taken by Professor Turley, I think John 
Roberts gave the right answer to Senator Durbin’s question.  Judges whose 
judicial role requires them to perform an action in a particular case that their 
religiously informed conscience tells them is immoral might indeed have to 
recuse themselves. 7  When a judge’s moral obligation to avoid culpable 
cooperation with evil prevents the judge from doing something that the law 
                                                 
6 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Skirmish Over a Query About Roberts’s Faith, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at 
A13. 
7 Cf. Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Catholic Social Teaching and American Legal Practice, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 277, 288 (2002) (“If the existing law is truly contrary to the conscientious convictions of the 
judge, the judge may have to recuse herself rather than cooperate in a morally evil action.”). 
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requires be done in a particular case, then the judge’s legal obligation to 
discharge his duties impartially directs him to disqualify himself from 
participating in the case.8  At the same time, I do not believe that these general 
principles, properly understood, lead to the troublesome consequences that 
Professor Turley seems to imagine.  We should not too quickly assume that there 
are a large number of situations in which a Catholic judge’s fidelity to his or her 
conscience will require the judge to refuse to fulfill their judicial duties in a 
particular case, and I think it is highly unlikely that such a situation will present 
itself in the context of Supreme Court adjudication. 
The analysis that leads to this conclusion moves through three steps.  Part 
I of the Essay will provide some of the context behind the controversy over John 
Roberts’ Catholicism.  In particular, it will focus attention on a critical distinction 
that is often overlooked in debates about the place of faith in public life: the 
distinction between the role of the legislator and the role of the judge.  Part II will 
then discuss the framework of moral analysis that we should use to assess 
                                                 
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 455: 
 
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questions. 
 (b)  He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge 
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 
 
See also John H. Garvey and Amy V. Coney [Barrett], Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQUETTE 
L. REV.303, 331-50 (1998) (discussing application of the recusal statute in the context of capital cases); cf. 
Rebekah L. Osborn, Current Development, Beliefs on the Bench: Recusal for Religious Reasons and Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 895, 897 (2006)(arguing that the ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct “effectively and appropriately addresses any concern [about the influence of judges’ 
religious beliefs on their decision making] by imposing an obligation to evaluate any potential bias while 
leaving recusal to the judge’s discretion”). 
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whether there is a conflict between the demands of a judge’s conscience9 and the 
demands of the law that might force the judge to withdraw from a case.  Moral 
theologians call this analytical framework the principle of cooperation with evil.  
Part III will then apply that principle in the context of three cases, two involving 
abortion and the other the death penalty, that arguably present a conflict 
between a judge’s conscience and the law.   
I. 
To begin, we need to focus a bit on the wider context that made the 
exchange between Senator Durbin and Judge Roberts such a lightening rod for 
controversy.  The first relevant element of that context is the Doctrinal Note on 
the Participation of Catholics in Political Life that was issued by the Vatican’s 
                                                 
9 The Catholic Church teaches that “[a] human being must always obey the certain judgment of his 
conscience.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH [hereinafter CCC] #1800; see also Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 681(Walter M. Abbot, S.J., ed., 1966) (“In all his 
activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in order that he may come to God, for whom he 
was created.  It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience.  Nor, on the 
other hand is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters 
religious.”).  See generally CCC ##1776-1802 (discussing the moral conscience).  Conscience must not, 
however, be understood simply as the right to do whatever one wants.  See, e.g., John Henry Newman, A 
Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s Recent Expostulation, 
in CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 453 (Commentary and Notes by James 
Gaffney, 1992) (Conscience must be understood “not as a fancy or an opinion, but as a dutiful obedience to 
what claims to be a divine voice speaking within us.”); id. at 450 (“Conscience has rights because it has 
duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to 
dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations.”).  The 
duty to follow one’s conscience is rooted in the duty to search for the truth and the obligation to form one’s 
conscience well.  See Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. 
Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 SO. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 9-13 
(2006); Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra, at 679 (“[A]ll men should be at once impelled by nature 
and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth …. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once 
it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.”); CCC, supra,  ##1783-
1785; see also Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, in ON CONSCIENCE (National Catholic 
Bioethics Center, 2007), at 22 (“The reduction of conscience to subjective certitude betokens at the same 
time a retreat from the truth.”); id. at 25 (“Conscience for Newman does not mean that the subject is the 
standard vis-à-vis the claims of authority in a truthless world …. Much more than that, conscience signifies 
the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of truth in the subject himself.  It is the overcoming of 
mere subjectivity in the encounter of the inferiority of man with the truth from God.”). 
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Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith in November of 2002.10  The Doctrinal 
Note reminds Catholics involved in public life that “a well-formed Christian 
conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an individual 
law which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals.”11  In 
particular, the Note states that “those who are directly involved in lawmaking 
bodies have a ‘grave and clear obligation to oppose any law that attacks human 
life.  For them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such laws or to 
vote for them.”12  As the Note explains, “[w]hen political activity comes up 
against moral principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or 
derogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and laden with 
responsibility.”13  Finally, the Note asserts that Catholic participation in political 
life raises “the lay Catholic’s duty to be morally coherent.”  This duty is “found 
within one’s conscience, which is one and indivisible.”14  None of us, including 
public officials, leads parallel moral lives that can be compartmentalized into 
                                                 
10 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on some questions regarding the Participation 
of Catholics in Political Life, (November 24, 2002), available at  
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica
_en.html. 
11 Id. at #4. 
12 Id.; see also John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 24 ORIGINS 689, 715 #73 (“In the case of an intrinsically 
unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to ‘take 
part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it.’”); John Finnis, Restricting Legalised 
Abortion is Not Intrinsically Unjust, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN 
HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Helen Watt, ed., 2005), at 209-45 (discussing the 
meaning of Evangelim Vitae #73 and the complexity of determining when a law in fact is an intrinsically 
unjust law permitting abortion).  Finnis argues that a provision is “permissive” of abortion and intrinsically 
unjust “only if it has the legal meaning and effect of reducing the state’s legal protection of the unborn.” Id. 
at 209; see also id. at 233 (consideration of the legal and legislative context and circumstances that give rise 
to a law, as well as a legislator’s intent in voting for the law, are relevant to assessing whether the law’s 
meaning and effect are “permissive” as that term is used in Evangelium Vitae #73).   
13 Doctrinal Note on Participation of Catholics in Political Life, supra note 10 at #4. 
14 Id. at #6.  
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separate spheres, one spiritual and one secular.  Instead, “[l]iving and acting in 
conformity with one’s own conscience on questions of politics is . . . the way in 
which Christians offer their concrete contributions so that, through political life, 
society will become more just and more consistent with the dignity of the human 
person.”15
These principles drawn from the CDF’s Doctrinal Note laid the 
foundation for the communion controversy that was sparked by statements 
made by a small number of bishops during the year before the 2004 presidential 
election.  That controversy forms a crucial element of the context behind the 
discussion of the relationship between Roberts’ faith and his role as a Supreme 
Court justice.  The bishops whose statements led to the communion controversy 
asserted that Catholic politicians who espouse pro-choice political positions 
should be excluded from receiving communion.16  As moral theologian Fr. Bryan 
Massingale explains, “the actions taken by these bishops were interpreted as just 
a shade less serious than public excommunication.”  Moreover, the bishops 
“were widely viewed as implying that it would be immoral for a Catholic to 
support or vote for a pro-choice candidate.”17  Bishop Michael Sheridan of 
                                                 
15 Doctrinal Note on Participation of Catholics in Political Life, supra note 10 at #6.  See also Gregory A. 
Kalscheur, S.J., American Catholics and the State, 191 AMERICA (August 2, 2004), pp. 15-18 (arguing that 
a public official’s commitment to moral integrity demands that his or her participation in public life should 
not be separated from his or her conscientious judgments regarding issues of justice, human dignity, and 
the common good). 
16 Cf. Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, supra note 2, at #83 (“[E]ucharistic consistency [is] a quality 
that our lives are objectively called to embody.  Worship pleasing to God can never be a purely private 
matter, without consequences for our relationships with others: it demands a public witness to our faith.”). 
17 Bryan Massingale, Catholic Participation in Political Life, 35 ORIGINS 469, 471 (Dec. 22, 2005). 
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Colorado Springs, in fact, explicitly made just that assertion.18  While the 
American bishops as a whole ultimately did not adopt this position,19 the 
communion controversy received widespread media coverage and generated 
significant anger and dismay among Catholic public officials, especially Catholic 
Democrats with public positions supporting abortion rights. 
The debate over John Roberts’ Catholicism in the summer of 2005 erupted 
in the midst of this lingering anger among some Catholic public officials that was 
provoked by the 2004 communion controversy. 20  In the wake of the exchange 
between Roberts and Durbin, commentators began openly to ask the following 
question: would the bishops treat the Catholic John Roberts in the same way in 
which they had treated the Catholic John Kerry?  Former New York Governor 
Mario Cuomo, for example, wondered “how those bishops who tormented 
[John] Kerry would react if [Judge] Roberts said that his religious views would 
                                                 
18 Bishop Michael Sheridan, The Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters, 34 ORIGINS 5, 6 (May 20, 2004) 
(“There must be no confusion in these matters.  Any Catholic politicians who advocate for abortion, for 
illicit stem-cell research or for any form of euthanasia ipso facto place themselves outside full communion 
with the church and so jeopardize their salvation.  Any Catholics who vote for candidates who stand for 
abortion, illicit stem-cell research or euthanasia suffer the same fateful consequences.  It is for this reason 
that these Catholics, whether candidates for office or those who would vote for them, may not receive holy 
communion until they have recanted their positions and been reconciled with God and the church in the 
sacrament of penance.”).  
19 Statement of the U.S. Bishops, Catholics in Political Life, 34 ORIGINS 98, 99 (July 1, 2004) (“The 
question has been raised as to whether the denial of holy communion to some Catholics in political life is 
necessary because of their public support for abortion on demand.  Given the wide range of circumstances 
involved in arriving at a prudential judgment on a matter of this seriousness, we recognize that such 
decisions rest with the individual bishop in accord with the established canonical and pastoral principles.  
Bishops can legitimately make different judgments on the most prudent course of pastoral action.”). 
20 Richard Garnett, Kmiec, Cuomo, and Russert, posted at 
http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2005/08/kmiec_cuomo_and.html (August 7, 2005) 
(describing the “lingering anger” of many Catholics over the communion controversy as the “back story” to 
the debate about Roberts’s Catholicism).  See also Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith 
and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1067 n.66 (1990) (discussing a 
similar communion controversy that erupted in 1989). 
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not affect his rulings on abortion cases.”21  Would not consistency demand that 
Judge Roberts be subjected to the same sort of criticism that had been directed at 
Senator Kerry? 
An op-ed piece by Michael McGough in the Los Angeles Times made a 
similar assertion:  “[F]or those bishops who do take a hard line against pro-choice 
legislators, there is no excuse in theology or logic for holding back from 
sanctioning Catholic judges – such as Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy – who vote to affirm or apply Roe vs. Wade.”22  Amy Sullivan on the 
blog Beliefnet made the same argument, claiming that “an honest look at the 
Church’s statements on the special responsibilities of Catholic public officials to 
uphold Church teaching on abortion must conclude that they do not exempt 
officials in judicial positions.”23
During the Senate confirmation hearings held in September 2005 and 
January 2006, Democratic senators pressed both John Roberts and Samuel Alito 
to speak about the relationship between their faith and their judicial role.  In 
response to questioning from Senator Diane Feinstein, Roberts made the 
following statement:  “[M]y faith and my religious beliefs do not play a role in 
                                                 
21 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why It’s Right to Ask About Roberts’s Faith, WASH. POST, August 2, 2005, at A13 
(quoting a phone conversation with Cuomo). 
22 Michael McGough, Catholic Judges and a Higher Authority, L.A. TIMES, August 1, 2005, at B11. 
23 Amy Sullivan, The Catholic Choice, posted at  http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story_17836.html.  
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judging.  When it comes to judging, I look to the law books and always have.  I 
don’t look to the Bible or any other religious source.”24
Five months later, during the Alito confirmation hearings, Senator Durbin 
asked Judge Alito what role his personal, religious, or moral beliefs would play 
in his judicial decision making process.  Alito’s answer echoed the answer given 
by John Roberts at his own confirmation hearings: “My obligation as a judge is to 
interpret and apply the Constitution and the laws of the United States and not 
my personal religious beliefs or any special moral belief that I have.  And there is 
nothing about my religious beliefs that interferes with my doing that.  I have a 
particular role to play as a judge.  That does not involve imposing any religious 
views that I have or moral views that I have on the rest of the country.”  Senator 
Durbin was quick to praise this answer, noting that Alito’s response 
acknowledged that Alito was describing “the same challenge many of us face on 
this side of the table with decisions we face.”25
Senator Durbin’s reaction to Judge Alito’s answer is worth pausing over.  
Catholic public officials like Senator Durbin, Senator Kerry, and Governor 
Cuomo have often responded to ecclesial criticism of their voting records by 
                                                 
24 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary (Sept. 13, 2005), available at 2005 WL 2214702 
(F.D.C.H.). 
25 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary (Jan. 11, 2006), available at 2006 WL 53273 
(F.D.C.H.).  Similar concerns and questions arose during the confirmation hearings of Justices William 
Brennan and Antonin Scalia.  See Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 305, 314-15 (2004) (discussing the Brennan and Scalia hearings); id. at 315 (“There is something 
fundamentally wrong with a process, supposedly in support of a pluralist society, which requires a 
candidate for judge to abjure any influence in his or her work from deeply held moral beliefs just because 
those beliefs are consonant with the judge’s religion.”); see also Levinson, supra note 20, at 1062-65 
(discussing the Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy confirmation hearings).  
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drawing a line between their personal religious and moral views and their public 
policy positions.  They contend that, while as Catholics they may be personally 
opposed to abortion, they cannot impose their personal religious views on the 
rest of the country.  The bishops’ frustration with this sort of separation of 
personal conscience from political policy was clearly one of the factors driving 
the communion controversy that followed the promulgation of the CDF 
Doctrinal Note.26  Senator Durbin seemed to suggest that he detected the same 
sort of separation of personal conscience and public decision making in Judge 
Alito and Judge Robert’s explanations of the relationship between their personal 
faith and their public role as judges.  In fact, Senator Durbin’s comment on Judge 
Alito’s answer implicitly suggests the following provocative question: if the 
bishops are so upset with Senator Kerry and Senator Durbin for separating their 
personal views as Catholics from their public policy positions, why doesn’t 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Archbishop William J. Levada, Reflections on Catholics in Political Life and the Reception of 
Holy Communion, 34 ORIGINS 101, 101-02 (July 1, 2004) (“Over the years since the 1973 Roe v. Wade 
Supreme Court decision, the frustration of many Catholics, bishops among them, about Catholic politicians 
who not only ignore church teaching on abortion but actively espouse a contrary position has continued to 
grow.”).  Bryan Massingale describes two frustrations on the part of the bishops.  First, the bishops are 
frustrated by what they see as inconsistency between the expressed personal opposition to abortion by 
many Catholic politicians and their failure to engage in public advocacy against abortion.  The second 
source of frustration is the assumption of many Catholic politicians (and members of the wider public) that 
opposition to abortion amounts to the imposition of a sectarian moral code on a pluralistic society.  The 
bishops maintain that the church’s opposition to abortion is based on the natural moral law – “a common 
moral truth that spans religious affiliations” – that can be recognized and embraced “by all reasonable 
people of good will.”  For the bishops, it is difficult to understand why a politician would hesitate to act on 
a conviction that “is an obvious conclusion of common morality,” rather than a sectarian position rooted in 
revelation.  See Massingale, supra note 17, at 472; see also Laurie Goodstein, Guiliani’s Views on Abortion 
Upset Catholic Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A14 (“[C]hurch leaders say they are frustrated by 
prominent Catholic politicians like Mr. Guiliani who argue that while they are personally opposed to 
abortion, they do not want to impose their beliefs on others.”); id. (“Archbishop John J. Meyers of Newark 
said … ‘To violate human life is always and everywhere wrong.  In fact, we don’t think it’s a matter of 
church teaching, but a matter of the way God made the world, and it applies to everyone.’”). 
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consistency demand that the bishops criticize Catholic judges for separating their 
Catholic beliefs from their public decision making as judges? 
In the context of the lingering anger over the communion controversy, this 
question of consistency really seems to have been the subtext underlying much 
of the debate about John Roberts’ Catholicism in the summer of 2005.  In order to 
answer Senator Durbin’s implicit question, however, we must keep in mind a 
critical distinction that is too often overlooked in contemporary debates about 
the role of faith in public life, namely, the distinction between the role of the 
judge in our constitutional system and the very different role of a legislator or a 
policy maker.  Senator Durbin is wrong to equate the moral challenges faced by 
legislators and judges in their decision making.  He is wrong because the 
different roles held by legislators and judges mean that legislators and judges are 
usually making very different sorts of decisions.27
Senator Durbin is not alone in sometimes seeming to blur the distinctions 
between the different roles played by judges and legislators.  After Justice 
O’Connor announced her retirement from the Court, Bishop William S. 
Skylstadt, president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, wrote a letter to 
President Bush outlining the qualities that he hoped the President “would 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[T]he judiciary does not sit as a 
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations in areas that neither 
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.”).  Cf. Robert K. Vischer, Professional Identity 
and the Contours of Prudence, 4 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS L.J. 46 (2007) (arguing that the different 
professional roles played by lawyers and judges make the exercise of prudential judgment look different in 
the context of lawyers’ decision making versus that of a lawyer); id. at 51 (“[L]awyers and judges can 
recognize and articulate the ends of prudential judgment only by recognizing and articulating the ends of 
their specific roles.”).       
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contemplate as [he] decide[d] on the appointment of her successor.”  Bishop 
Skylstadt urged the President to consider candidates with the following 
characteristics: 
[Q]ualified jurists who, pre-eminently, support the protection of human 
life from conception to natural death, especially of those who are unborn, 
disabled, or terminally ill.  I would ask you to consider jurists who are 
cognizant of the rights of minorities, immigrants and those in need; 
respect the role of religion and of religious institutions in our society and 
protections afforded them by the First Amendment; recognize the value of 
parental choice in education; and favor restraining and ending the use of 
the death penalty.28
 
While one can sympathize with Bishop Skylstad’s hope that the President will 
nominate jurists who support policies that comport with the basic moral 
principles of Catholic social teaching, it is quite another matter to assume that all 
of those moral principles are rooted in the U.S. Constitution and other sources of 
law in a way that makes them appropriate sources for judicial – in contrast to 
legislative – decision making.  As Professor Theresa Collett notes, “the good of 
communal self-governance” demands that “deep respect for the positive law 
should govern the vast majority of a judge’s decisions.”29
                                                 
28 USCCB Head Writes President Bush on Supreme Court Vacancy, available at 
http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/2005/05-155.shtml. 
29 Collett, Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 4, at 1299.  Accordingly, when religious 
wisdom “conflicts with the political choices embodied in the positive law,” judicial reliance on religious 
wisdom should be restricted.  Id.; cf. Ori Lev, Personal Morality and Judicial Decision-Making in the 
Death Penalty Context, 11 J.L. & RELIGION, 637, 641 (1994-1995) (“[I]f the law recognized a judge’s 
morality as a legitimate source of law, a judge … could legitimately invoke such morality as the basis of 
decision.  Given the ‘thoroughgoing positivism’ of the American legal tradition, however, reliance on one’s 
personal morality is an illegitimate basis for decision.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some 
Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 36 (1989) (natural 
law “cannot actually displace clear positive law without also displacing the idea of democratic self-
government under a written constitution (a value itself supported by natural law).”).        
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This sort of judicial respect for positive law – a respect grounded in a 
moral commitment to the good of democratic self-government – is consistent 
with a proper understanding of the differentiated relationship that exists 
between law and morality.  As Professor Robert George explains,  
[T]he question of how much legislative authority a judge has to translate 
the natural law into positive law by nullifying positive law which he 
believes to be unjust is a question of positive law, not natural law.  
Different political systems reasonably differ (both in theory and practice) 
as to how much legislative authority they confer upon judges.30
 
This “positivism” of judicial respect for positive law in light of the limited nature 
of the judge’s role in the American constitutional system does not, however, 
mean that judges have no responsibility to evaluate the positive law in light of 
fundamental moral principles as they carry out their judicial duties: 
According to natural law theorists, judges are under the same obligations 
of truth telling that the rest of us are under.  If the [positive] law [that the 
                                                 
30 Letter from Robert George to Sanford Levinson, quoted in Levinson, supra note 20, at 1076 n.85; see 
also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Restoring the Right Constitution? 116 YALE L.J. 101, 133 (2007) (“[T]here is 
no intrinsic connection between the natural law’s potent language for talking about the moral quality of the 
law and unrestrained judicial power.  In other words, an affirmation of natural law theory is every bit as 
consistent with judicial minimalism…as it is with …judicial supremacy.”); Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Remarks at Pew Forum Panel Discussion: A Call for Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty (Jan. 25, 
2002), transcript available at http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php3 (“[M]y 
difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one.  I do not believe – and no one believed for 
200 years – that the Constitution contains a right to abortion.  And if a state were to permit abortion on 
demand, I would and could in good conscience vote against an attempt to invalidate that law, for the same 
reason that I vote against invalidation of laws that contradict Roe v. Wade; namely, simply because the 
Constitution gives the federal government and, hence, me no power over the matter.”).  The extent to which 
nontextual moral norms might, in fact, properly be understood as judicially enforceable principles of 
constitutional law has been a contested question since the early days of U.S. constitutional history.  See 
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Christian Scripture and American Scripture: An Instructive Analogy? 21 J.L. & 
RELIGION 101, 133 (2005-2006) (discussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), and the exchange between 
Justice Chase and Justice Iredell regarding the judicial enforceability of non-textual principles of natural 
justice); see also Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. 
Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 SO. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J.1, 15-
20 & 15 n.71 (2006) (even in the absence of explicit constitutional limitations, respect for human dignity 
places some matters beyond the legitimate power of a limited, constitutional government); Levinson, supra 
note 20, at 1074-81 (discussing the relevance of morality to constitutional analysis); cf. notes 37-41 infra 
and accompanying text.   
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judge is called on to interpret and apply] is in conflict with the natural 
law, the judge may not lie about it.  If his duty is to give judgment 
according to the positive law, then he must either (i) do so or (ii) recuse 
himself.  If he can give judgment according to immoral positive law 
without rendering himself … complicit in its immorality, and without 
giving scandal, then he may licitly do so (though he may also licitly recuse 
himself).  If not, then he must recuse himself.31
    
Thus, the distinct roles played by judges and legislators within the 
American constitutional system call judges and legislators to make different sorts 
of decisions with respect to the law.  The role of the legislator is to craft laws that 
will best protect that limited portion of the common good that is committed to 
the care of the state acting through law.32  Let us assume that a legislator states 
sincerely that he or she is persuaded that abortion is a grave moral evil because it 
is an attack on the inviolable dignity of human life.  That conscientious 
conclusion is not simply a matter of personal morality with no public import; it is 
a moral conviction that ought to have consequences for how that legislator thinks 
about public policy.  Because abortion ends a human life, it is not simply a 
private matter.  Instead, as an attack on the fundamental human right to life, 
abortion is contrary to justice and the common good.33  If a legislator desires to 
live a life of integrity and moral coherence, his or her participation in politics 
should not be cut off from the conscientious judgment he or she has made about 
                                                 
31 Letter from Robert George, supra note 30 (discussing the “positivism” of Justice Scalia). 
32 For a discussion of the proper limits on the use of the law to promote the common good, see Kalscheur, 
Moral Limits on Morals Legislation, supra note 30, at 13-30.  See also Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, Donum Vitae (Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-
for-human-life_en.html, Part III (“In no sphere of life can the civil law … dictate norms concerning things 
which are outside its competence.”).  
33 See Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation, supra note 30, at 27. 
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the morality of abortion.  Because the legislator’s role is to craft positive law that 
will best promote the common good, a legislator who holds the conscientious 
conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil for that reason has a duty to promote 
justice and the common good by striving to craft laws that will accomplish a 
reduction in the incidence of abortion. 
How a policy maker should go about striving to reduce the incidence of 
abortion in contemporary American culture, under existing constitutional 
constraints, and in the face of significant social disagreement with regard to the 
underlying moral issue, is an exceptionally complicated question.  Good 
lawmaking is never simply a matter of directly transposing moral conclusions 
into rules of civil law.  Drawing on jurisprudential principles rooted in the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas, the Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray 
explained that moral law and civil law are essentially related, but necessarily 
differentiated: 
Both the science and art of jurisprudence and also the statesman’s craft 
rest on the differential character of law and morals, of legal experience 
and religious or moral experience, of political unity and religious unity.  
The jurist’s work proceeds from the axiom that the principles of religion or 
morality cannot be transgressed, but neither can they be immediately translated 
into civilized human law.  There is an intermediate step, the inspection of 
circumstances and the consideration of … the public advantage to be 
found, or not found, in transforming a moral or religious principle into a 
compulsory rule for general enforcement upon society. 34
                                                 
34 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion, in RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 59-60 (Leon Hooper, S.J., ed., 1993) (emphasis added); 
see CDF, Donum Vitae III, supra note 32, Part III (“The intervention of the public authority must be 
inspired by the rational principles which regulate the relationships between civil law and moral law. [The 
civil law] must sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public order, things which it cannot forbid without a 
greater evil resulting.”); R. Mary Hayden Lemmons, Juridical Prudence and the Toleration of Evil: 
Aquinas and John Paul II, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 24, 28-29 (2006) (“A certain degree of harm must be 
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Thus, the complex question of how best to promote fundamental moral values 
through civil law so as to most effectively promote the common good in the 
particular social context facing the legislator is always a contingent question that 
calls for the legislator to exercise the virtue of prudence.35  
While the role of the legislator is to strive to embody in positive law those 
policies that will (in the conscientious, prudential judgment of the legislator) best 
promote the common good, the role of the judge with regard to the common 
good is significantly different.  “[T]he choices involved in making law differ from 
                                                                                                                                                 
tolerated, otherwise the burden on those not yet virtuous would be so unbearable that they ‘would break out 
into yet greater evils.’”) (quoting Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 96 a.2, reply to objection 
2); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship between Civil 
Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT 231, 253-58, 263-64, 266-67 (2004); M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary 
Virtue: The Limits of the Criminal Law in Implementing Evangelium Vitae, in CHOOSING LIFE: A 
DIALOGUE ON EVANGELIUM VITAE 132-49 (K. Wildes & A. Mitchell, eds., 1997); see also James L. Heft, 
S.M., Religion and Politics: The Catholic Contribution, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29, 42 (2006) (“[I]t is 
necessary for all Catholics, and for Catholic legislators, to agree with the Church’s moral teaching on 
abortion.  But I also find it not so clear when it comes to how best to translate that moral teaching into civil 
law in a society where only one-fourth of the population is Catholic, and when Catholics are not all of one 
mind on how to deal with Roe v. Wade. … [T]he bishops should be more helpful to legislators by 
acknowledging the complexities of the decisions they need to make on legislative matters related to moral 
issues.”); John Langan, S.J., Observations on Abortion and Politics, 191 AMERICA, 9, 11 (Oct. 25, 2004) 
(“[T]he enactment of any prohibition of abortion is not simply the enunciation of a moral truth; it is a 
political and legal act which is to be carried out in an arena where there are many conflicting points of view 
and interests and where there is widespread hostility to the pro-life position.”).  
35 See Kalscheur, American Catholics and the State, supra note 15, at 17.  See also Lemmons, supra note 
34, at 29-33 (discussing the principles of juridical prudence that inform conscientious legislating); 
Kalscheur, Relationship between Civil Law and Moral Law, supra note 34, at 255-57; John Langan, S.J., 
Homily for Fr. Robert Drinan’s Funeral, 36 ORIGINS 556, 557 (February 15, 2007) (“The shape of 
legislation can be a matter for prudential disagreement, not an issue of faithfulness.”); Anthony Fisher, 
O.P., The Duties of a Catholic Politician with Respect to Bio-Lawmaking, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & 
PUBLIC POL’Y 89, 118-19 (2006) (discussing the virtue of political prudence); id. at 121 (“We must …be 
loathe to judge our confreres who differ from us on prudential matters in the battle against abortion and 
euthanasia); Massingale, supra note 17, at 470 (“Prudence . . .  seeks not the absolute best, but the best that 
can be attained for now.”); Archbishop John Quinn, The Virtue of Prudence and the Spectrum of Issues 
Affecting Human Dignity, 34 ORIGINS 334, 335 (Nov. 4, 2004) (“It is fitting to bring into our Catholic 
consciousness the tradition of prudence in the church’s teaching, with its probing question, What will make 
the situation better rather than worse for the protection of life in the full array of its claims?  To lose sight 
of the full spectrum of issues which affect human dignity runs the grave risk of playing into the hands of 
those who are eager to allege that the pro-life stance is a sectarian issue.”).  For a helpful discussion of the 
nuanced, contextual operation of the virtue of prudence, see Vischer, supra note 27, at 50-52.  
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those involved in deciding law.”36  The role of the judge in our constitutional 
system is not primarily or directly to make public policy.  Instead, the primary 
role of the judge is to use the tools of legal analysis to interpret the Constitution 
and laws and to apply those laws as they exist in the context of deciding 
individual cases. 
It is true that legal interpretation and judicial decision making often 
properly involves more than the mechanical deduction of conclusions from 
determinate legal norms.  Legal norms can be indeterminate in a way that 
demands judicial specification in concrete cases. 37  Yet there is still a critical 
difference between the role of legislators and that of judges.  In exercising their 
role, legislators have the freedom to make whatever policy choices are not 
prohibited by the constitution that empowers them to act.  Judges, in contrast, do 
not have unbounded policy making power.38  The legislator promotes the 
                                                 
36 Lemmons, supra note 34, at 30 (Because the choices involved are different, “legislative and judicial 
cases must be distinguished and treated separately.”).  
37 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 92-93 
(2007).  Specifying an indeterminate legal norm “is not a process of deduction or simple application of a 
general rule to a specific case; instead it is an exercise of good judgment.”  See also Gregory A. Kalscheur, 
S.J., Christian Scripture and American Scripture: An Instructive Analogy? 21 J. L. & REL. 101, 135 (2005-
2006) (discussing Perry’s approach to constitutional interpretation).  To the extent that such a power to 
exercise good judgment involves “‘a creative decision … a kind of legislative judgment’”, that power 
“arguably belongs in the hands of the politically dependent, because electorally accountable, policymaking 
officials of the legislative and/or executive branches of government.”  Perry, supra, at 93 (quoting Richard 
A. Posner, What am I? A Potted Plant?, New Republic 23, 24 (Sept. 28, 1987)); see also id. at 107 
(endorsing a “system of judicial penultimacy” with respect to constitutionally entrenched indeterminate 
human rights norms as offering “the best of both worlds: an opportunity for a deliberative judicial 
consideration of a difficult and perhaps divisive human rights issue and an opportunity for electorally 
accountable officials to respond in a politically effective way”).   
38 See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQUETTE L. REV. 351, 351 (1998) (“Judges, 
of course, wield political power…. But judges exercise a special kind of power.  Generally speaking, the 
judicial function is not one of lawmaking, but of law application.  It is the judge’s task to determine what 
the law is and to apply it in the cases before him or her.”).  Legislators (and constitution makers) create the 
texts that articulate the norms which provide the “textual anchor” and discretion-limiting “tether” for 
legitimate judicial decision making: 
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common good by striving to enact just legal norms.  The judge promotes the 
common good by interpreting, applying, and specifying legislatively enacted or 
constitutionally entrenched legal norms in a way that upholds the fundamental 
component of the common good that is known as the rule of law.39  While the 
judge’s convictions regarding morality and justice will properly play a role in the 
development of the law,40 the role of the judge in our constitutional system 
places constraints on the judge’s freedom simply to reshape the law to conform 
to his or her moral convictions about what the law ought to be in order to 
promote justice and the common good.41
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Without a textual anchor for their decisions, judges would have to rely on some theory of natural 
right, or some allegedly shared standard of the ends and the limits of government, to strike down 
invasive legislation.  But an appeal to normative ideals that lack any mooring in the written 
law…would in societies like ours be suspect, because it would represent so profound an aberration 
from majoritarian principles.…A text, moreover, is necessary not only to make judges’ decisions 
efficacious: it also helps to tether their discretion.  I would be the last to cabin judges’ power to 
keep the law vital, to ensure that it remains abreast of the progress in man’s intellect and 
sensibilities.  Unbounded freedom, however, is another matter.  One can imagine a system of 
governance that accorded judges almost unlimited discretion, but it would be one reminiscent of 
the rule by Platonic Guardians that Judge Learned Hand so feared. 
 
Perry, supra note 37, at 206 n. 13 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 9 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUDIES 425, 432 (1989)); see also id. at 139 (“‘The search must be for a [judicial] function 
…which differs from the legislative and executive functions; …which can be so exercised as to be 
acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge [Learned] Hand’s satisfaction in a ‘sense of common 
venture’; which will be effective when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality 
of the other departments’ performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own 
responsibility.’” (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24 (1962))) .   
39 Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-73 (1980) (discussing the relationship 
between the rule of law and the requirements of justice and the common good). 
40 See Vischer, supra note 27, at 63 (“[T]he law’s indeterminacy may allow a judge’s rightly formed 
conception of justice to have a positive impact on the law’s development.  ‘The judge’s sense of right and 
wrong,’ after all, ‘shapes, to some extent, the direction in which the law evolves’.”) (quoting Dulles, supra 
note 7, at 288). 
41 See Dulles, supra note 7, at 287-88.  See also Vischer, supra note 27, at 61 (“[F]or a judge, extralegal 
moral norms should be kept at the margins when evaluating the performance of her professional role.… 
[B]y looking beyond her own moral convictions (which is a starkly different proposition than pretending 
her own moral convictions do not exist), she can acknowledge the moral significance of judging without 
subverting the rule of law.”); William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American 
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Consider this example drawn from the work of Judge John Noonan of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  In 1995, Judge Noonan authored an 
opinion rejecting a constitutional challenge to the state of Washington’s 
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide.  One of the plaintiffs challenging the 
statute was a group called Compassion in Dying.  Judge Noonan’s opinion 
closed with these words: “Compassion cannot be the compass of a federal judge.  
That compass is the Constitution of the United States.”42  Similarly, while a judge 
appropriately brings his or her convictions regarding justice and morality to the 
work of deciding cases,43 Catholic moral doctrine cannot displace the 
Constitution and laws of the United States as the legal compass guiding the 
judge faced with the task of deciding what a particular provision of the law 
means in the context of a specific case.  There is no official Church teaching that 
defines what the U.S. Constitution means.  Indeed, such a question is beyond the 
competence of the Church’s teaching office.44  Judge Noonan did not uphold the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 355-58 (2006) (discussing how the role and duty of the 
judge differs from that of the legislator or executive).    
42 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 1995) 
43 See notes 40-41, supra, and accompanying text. 
44 Cardinal Levada, formerly archbishop of San Francisco and now the head of the Vatican Congregation 
on the Doctrine of the Faith, has asserted that the “Supreme Court’s judgment about the application of the 
Constitution should … be guided by the principles of the moral law.”  Levada, supra note 26, at 104.  It is 
not clear what Cardinal Levada means here, but we need not conclude that he is arguing that the Supreme 
Court has the power to make decisions that comply with the principles of the moral law even when there is 
no basis in proper constitutional analysis for so concluding.  Cardinal Levada notes, for example, that 
Catholic moral teaching recognizes “that those who make and interpret the law are not always able to deal 
with ideal or perfect solutions.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, the Cardinal would seem to acknowledge that 
proper interpretation of the Constitution may sometimes preclude a decision that reflects the “ideal or 
perfect” embodiment of the moral law.  As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec, explains, “[t]here is no ‘Catholic 
way’ of interpreting the U.S. Constitution.  The tools of constitutional interpretation are its text, history, 
and structure.”  While Catholics with familiarity with the natural law tradition “will more readily grasp that 
our constitutional history includes the self-evident truths of creation, equality, and unalienable rights 
referenced in the Declaration of Independence,” these are not exclusively Catholic truths.  Douglas W. 
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Washington statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide because it conformed 
to the Church’s teaching that physician-assisted suicide is a moral evil.45  Instead, 
Judge Noonan upheld the statute because nothing in the Constitution prohibited 
the state from enacting such a statute. 
What should a morally conscientious judge do, however, when the law as 
it exists is truly unjust and the action that the law requires of the judge in a given 
case is truly in conflict with the conscientious convictions of the judge?  This 
question brings us back to the exchange between Senator Durbin and John 
Roberts:  What would you do, the Catholic senator asked the Catholic judge, if 
the law required you to issue a ruling that the Catholic Church considered 
immoral?  Roberts replied that, in such a conflict between his Catholic moral 
beliefs and the ruling required by the law, he would probably have to recuse 
himself.  In this sort of situation, the conscientious judge might indeed have to 
remove himself in order to avoid cooperating in a morally evil action.  In other 
words, the judge will have to decide whether the action required of him by the 
law in a particular case culpably contributes to the morally objectionable act of 
another person. 
This, then, becomes the crucial question: Does the desire to avoid 
cooperation in moral evil make the conscientious Catholic unfit for judicial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kmiec, The Catholic Judge and Roe v. Wade (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story_17832_1.html.     
45 See John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae,  supra note 12, at 712 #66 (“To concur with the intention of another 
person to commit suicide and to help in carrying it out through so-called ‘assisted suicide’ means to 
cooperate in and at times to be the actual perpetrator of an injustice which can never be excused even if it is 
requested.”). 
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service in a constitutional system that will inevitably bring before the Catholic 
judge cases that implicate a host of issues as to which the Church offers moral 
teaching?  I think the answer to that question is no; there is no good reason why 
a conscientious Catholic should not be able to serve as a judge, and a judge’s 
Catholicism should not raise any special suspicions about his or her ability 
faithfully to carry out the judicial role in the vast majority of cases that will come 
before the judge.  In order to understand why this is so, we need to take a very 
short course in a fairly complicated corner of moral theology. 
II. 
In everyday life, all of us in various ways find ourselves cooperating in 
the morally objectionable actions of other people.  A person might, for example, 
live in a state that provides public funding for embryonic stem cell research.  
Assume that the person accepts the Church’s teaching that the destruction of 
embryonic human life is a moral evil.  Taxes collected from that person will help 
facilitate the destruction of human embryos.  Because the tax money facilitates 
the research, the person is cooperating in what he has concluded is a morally evil 
act.  At the same time, however, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that the 
taxpayer himself is committing a morally evil act simply by paying his taxes as 
the law requires.46  In order to help people navigate these sorts of situations 
                                                 
46 Cf. GERMAIN GRISEZ, 3 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 871 (1997) 
(“[A]ltogether avoiding cooperation … is virtually impossible and sometimes inconsistent with doing one’s 
duty.… [T]hough taxpayers materially cooperate with nuclear deterrence and other evils, paying taxes is 
morally obligatory.”). 
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without themselves committing wrongful actions, moral theologians have 
developed an analytical framework that is called the principle of cooperation.47
Before going any further down this road, I want to offer a disclaimer: the 
principle of cooperation is not a bright-line rule that provides us with many easy 
answers.  In fact, an English Jesuit theologian once wrote in a textbook that, of all 
the principles in moral theology, the principle of cooperation is the most difficult 
to apply.48  In light of that difficulty, I want to acknowledge from the outset that 
the conclusions drawn from application of the principle of cooperation to 
particular cases can often be open to dispute.  Indeed, the principle of 
cooperation “is not designed automatically to generate undebatable answers to 
what are undeniably complex questions.”49  But the principle of cooperation is 
the analytical tool that the Catholic tradition gives us to help us try to sort out 
which conflicts between conscience and the law ought to lead conscientious 
judges to refrain from deciding particular cases.  With that in mind, all we can do 
is make our best effort to use the tool the tradition makes available. 
                                                 
47 For a recent discussion of the principle of cooperation in the judicial context, see Edward A. Hartnett, 
Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS L.J. 221 (2006). 
48 See Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, The Man With a Ladder, 191 AMERICA (Nov. 1, 2004), at 9 (referring to 
Henry Davis, S.J., author of Moral and Pastoral Theology (1958)). 
49 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
280, 284 (2000); see also BERNARD HÄRING, 2 THE LAW OF CHRIST 500-01 (1963) (“It is far from our mind 
to suggest final solutions.  In fact, it is not at all possible to arrive at blanket solutions in every conceivable 
case if one takes into account every aspect of the problem.  Our first task is to illustrate the universal 
principles which are always valid.  The conclusions we arrive at individual instances, however, may in their 
concrete application under different sets of circumstances involve new principles.”).  Häring explains that 
looking at particular cases is a useful way to illustrate general axioms, but the cases “do not furnish a facile 
and final solution.  Every new situation must draw from the spirit of the Gospel its own proper solution 
based on openness to the concrete realites.”  Id. at 481; cf. id. at 483 (“[I]t may be difficult, and perhaps 
well-nigh impossible, to determine with finality in purely legal fashion what actually is and what is not 
scandal in concrete circumstances.”). 
 25
The general definition of cooperation with evil is “concurrence with 
another person in [an] act” that is morally wrong.50  Professor M. Cathleen 
Kaveny, who teaches both law and moral theology at Notre Dame, notes that the 
principle of cooperation addresses the following sorts of questions: “How do we 
decide when the contribution that our action will make to another’s wrongdoing 
is too great, or the connection between their action and ours is too close?  When 
does making such a contribution [adversely affect our moral character], and 
when it is it simply the regrettable, inevitable consequence of living in a fallen 
world that is also ineluctably social?”51  Bishop Anthony Fisher, articulates the 
questions addressed by the principle of cooperation in this way:  “How close to 
taking part in the act itself can one person get to the wrongful act of another, 
without becoming a culpable accessory?”52
The analytical framework that has developed around the principle of 
cooperation begins to answer these questions by making a crucial distinction 
between formal cooperation and material cooperation.53  Pope John Paul II, in 
the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, stated that everyone is “under a grave obligation 
of conscience not to cooperate formally” in evil actions.54  Formal cooperation is 
defined as cooperating in a morally wrongful act while “sharing in the immoral 
                                                 
50 Kaveny, supra note 49, at 282 (quoting textbook by Henry Davis, S.J.). 
51 Id. at 283. 
52 Id. (quoting Anthony Fisher, Cooperation in Evil, 44 CATHOLIC MEDICAL QUARTERLY 15 (1994)).  
53 Id. at 284. 
54 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 12, at 715 #74 (discussing the general principles concerning 
cooperation in the evil actions of another). 
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intention of the person committing [the act].”55  Put simply, formal cooperation 
in evil is always wrong.56
Material cooperation, in contrast, can sometimes be justified for a 
proportionate reason.57  A person engages in material cooperation when he or 
she does something that facilitates or creates the conditions for a wrongful act, 
but the person does not share in the intention of the actor who actually engages 
in the wrongful conduct.    An actor has a proportionate reason to engage in 
material cooperation when the actor reaches the conclusion that the reasons for 
acting “are sufficiently strong that doing the act would be reasonable despite the 
more or less strong reasons to forgo” the act of cooperation.58  Reaching this 
judgment about the comparative strength of the arguments for and against 
engaging in the act of cooperation is the work of prudence,59 and the 
permissibility of material cooperation has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
Moral theologians have developed elaborate sets of categories that attempt to 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Kopfensteiner, supra note 48, at 10. 
57 As Cardinal Levada explains, 
 
the complex moral analysis of the liceity of material cooperation in evil can be helpful as 
guidance for Catholics in political life.  When formal cooperation (evil as intended) is excluded, 
some degree of material cooperation may be justified, according to the analysis of an individual 
situation: Is the person’s right intention sufficiently known? Will scandal be avoided? Does the 
cooperation aim at lessening the bad effects of the cooperation? 
 
Levada, supra note 26, at 104.     
58 GRISEZ, supra note 46, at 884. 
59 Id. at 885; see id. at 884-89 (discussing how the conscientious actor judges the relative strength of the 
arguments regarding proportionate reason). 
 27
capture the various factors that help to determine whether a person has a 
proportionate reason to engage in an act of material cooperation.60
For example, the tradition makes an important distinction between remote 
material cooperation and proximate material cooperation.  As an act of material 
cooperation gets closer to the wrongful act in time, space, or causal connection, 
the harder it is to justify.61  Whether or not a proportionate reason justifying the 
act exists may in turn depend on additional factors.  For example, how grave a 
loss would be suffered by the cooperator if she declines to engage in the act of 
cooperation?  What is the magnitude of the evil that will result from the 
wrongful act intended by the other person?  How certain is it that the act of 
cooperation really will be misused by the other person?  How probable is it that 
refusal to engage in the act of cooperation would prevent the wrongdoing by the 
other person?  And, finally, how much risk is there that the act of cooperation 
will cause scandal to others?62  Professor Kaveny notes that “causing scandal” in 
this context has to be understood in its specialized theological sense: does 
                                                 
60 The summary of the analytical framework that follows is drawn from Professor Kaveny’s 2000 article in 
Theological Studies.  See Kaveny, supra note 49, at 284-86.  See also M. Cathleen Kaveny, Prophecy and 
Casuistry: Abortion, Torture and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REV. 499, 526-530 (2006) (describing the 
“extremely nuanced distinctions” that characterize the analytical matrix governing the issue of cooperation 
with evil). 
61 See, e.g., HÄRING, supra note 49, at 499 (“These reasons [which justify material cooperation] must be the 
more valid and weighty … the more proximate our contribution or cooperation in the sinful action of 
others ….”).  Grisez rejects this distinction.  He argues that the closeness of a material cooperator’s 
involvement in the wrongdoing of another is not morally significant of itself.  The closeness of involvement 
does, however, “correlate[ ] more or less well with many of the factors affecting the strength of reasons not 
to cooperate.”  Highly proximate cooperation may, for example, make it more difficult for the cooperator to 
witness to the truth and may create a higher risk of scandal to others.  “Still closeness of involvement is 
morally insignificant unless correlated with some factor that affects the strength of the reason not to 
cooperate.”  GRISEZ, supra note 46, at 890.  
62 See HÄRING, supra note 49, at 499 (describing the reasons that justify material cooperation and “which 
may even suggest and advise it, if they do not go so far as to oblige it”)  
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performing a particular action increase the possibility that people who witness 
the action will engage in morally objectionable activity themselves?  Will the act 
of cooperation have the effect of leading other people into sin?63
This framework for analysis was refined over time through the process of 
comparing and contrasting particular cases that is known as casuistry.  Among 
the classic cases discussed by the casuists was a situation particularly relevant to 
the role of the judge: can a Catholic judge preside over a divorce case?  The 
traditional answer is yes; for grave and proportionate reasons, such judges may 
act in accordance with the traditional principles of material cooperation.64  The 
casuists argued that it generally promotes the common good for a conscientious 
judge to be part of the legal system, because of the justice that we hope the work 
of the judge can bring to the institution of the law as a whole.65  The judge, 
therefore, has a proportionate reason for being faithful to the demands of the law 
in this case. 
                                                 
63 See Kaveny, supra note 49, at 285-86 & n. 14. 
64 See John Paul II, Marriage Indissolubility and the Roles of Judges and Lawyers (Address to the Roman 
Rota), 31 ORIGINS 597, 601 (“For grave and proportionate motives [judges] may act in accord with the 
traditional principles of material cooperation.”); see also Hartnett, supra note 47, at 246-48 (discussing 
judicial cooperation in the context of divorce); BERNARD HÄRING, 2 THE LAW OF CHRIST 511 (1963) 
(“Should [the judge] in no way be able to prevent the action [i.e., granting a divorce to a couple whose 
marriage is valid before God], despite all his sincere efforts, we may look upon the granting of the divorce 
as material cooperation which is permitted for a grave reason; for loss of office would indeed be a grave 
consideration.”); FRANCIS J. CONNELL, MORALS IN POLITICS AND PROFESSIONS: A GUIDE FOR CATHOLICS 
IN PUBLIC LIFE 31 (1946) ( noting that a “sufficiently weighty” reason for a judge to preside over a divorce 
case “would seem to be present if the judge were in danger of losing his office in the event that he refused 
to accept a divorce suit, or even if serious antagonism and loss of prestige ensued”).  
65 See James F. Keenan, S.J., Cooperation, Principle of, in THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT (Judith A. Dwyer, ed. 1994), at 234 (A judge may preside over a divorce case, “not solely or 
even because of [his] financial needs … but rather because of the hope that [his] presence in the institution 
will lead to less wrongdoing in the future.”). 
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This analytical framework also applies to the individual Catholic in his or 
her role as voter.  As noted above, prior to the 2004 election, the bishop of 
Colorado Springs, Michael Sheridan, suggested that any Catholic who votes in 
favor of a pro-choice candidate, illicit embryonic stem cell research, or 
euthanasia, “may not receive holy communion until they have recanted their 
positions and been reconciled with God and the church in the sacrament of 
penance.”66  Shortly thereafter, the current pope, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, 
in his role as head of the Vatican Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, sent 
a memorandum regarding worthiness to receive communion to Cardinal 
Theodore McCarrick, then-archbishop of Washington, who was chair of the U.S. 
bishops’ task force on Catholic politicians.  Cardinal Ratzinger’s memorandum 
concluded with a discussion of the principle of cooperation as it applies to a 
voter: 
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy 
to present himself for holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote for 
a candidate precisely because of the candidate’s permissive stand on 
abortion and/or euthanasia.  When a Catholic does not share a 
candidate’s stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for 
that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote, material 
cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate 
reasons.67   
 
                                                 
66 Bishop Michael Sheridan, The Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters, 34 ORIGINS 5, 6 (May 20, 
2004); see notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text (discussing the 2004 communion controversy). 
67 Cardinals Joseph Ratzinger and Theodore McCarrick, Vatican, U.S. Bishops: On Catholics in Political 
Life, 34 ORIGINS 133, 134 (July 29, 2004) (emphasis added); cf. Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 
supra note 2, at #83 (noting that the lives of all the baptized, including those involved in political life, “are 
objectively called to embody” a quality characterized as “eucharistic consistency”). 
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Cardinal Ratzinger, however, did not explain how the voter was to assess 
whether or not proportionate reasons existed that would justify a vote for a 
candidate who takes a permissive stand on abortion or euthanasia.  The 
undersecretary of the Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, Fr. Augustine 
DiNoia noted that “defining what constitutes ‘proportionate’ reasons is 
extremely difficult,”68 and he suggested that the following conclusion could be 
drawn from Cardinal Ratzinger’s memorandum: “[A] person might come to be 
in the state of mortal sin and therefore unworthy to receive Communion if they 
voted precisely with the moral object of extending abortion or the provision of 
abortion, but that would be the only case where that would happen.”69
In the wake of Cardinal Ratzinger’s memorandum, those few American 
bishops who spoke to the issue of “proportionate reasons” took a range of 
positions on whether or not such reasons might exist in the context of the 
presidential election.70  Archbishop Myers of Newark, New Jersey, and 
Archbishop Burke of St. Louis, both argued that abortion was such a grave and 
widespread moral evil that no proportionate reason existed that would justify 
voting for a pro-choice candidate.71  Then-Archbishop Levada of San Francisco, 
however, suggested that proportionate reasons might exist that could justify 
                                                 
68 Heft, Abortion and Proportionate Reasons, supra note 1, at 271. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 264. 
71 Id. at 264-65; cf. id. at 271 (“Even if they are right about the moral gravity of [abortion and embryonic 
stem-cell research], and I believe that they are, it does not necessarily follow that voting for a pro-life 
candidate, for such reasons, makes the most sense.”). 
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such a vote: “if a Catholic voted for a candidate despite his or her pro-choice 
stance, it would not necessarily be sinful.”72
The remarks of Fr. DiNoia and Archbishop Levada suggest that “issues 
which require a person to employ proportionate reasoning on the issue of voting 
are matters of prudence on which people of good will might well differ.”73  
Indeed, the bishops of Virginia stated that voters should approach the question 
of “proportionate reasons” in this way: 
Assessing proportionality is a matter for the individual conscience.  However, a 
conscience must be correctly formed before it can be properly followed.  In other 
words, we must seek the “mind of Christ” in the voting judgments we make, just 
as we must do when contemplating any other moral decisions in our lives.  We 
urge each of you to inform your own consciences thoroughly, weighing all issues 
from the perspective of church teaching and of their implications for our brothers 
and sisters in the human family.  In doing so, it is important to recognize just how 
serious abortion is when considering whether there are proportionate (i.e. very 
serious) reasons for making other important issues the decisive factor in your 
voting choices.74
 
The gravity of the moral evil of abortion clearly is a crucial consideration in 
assessing whether it is morally appropriate to vote for a particular candidate.  
Yet a voter should also consider seriously the degree to which a particular 
candidate is likely to be able to diminish the actual incidence of abortion, 
especially in light of the current constitutional status of the right to make the 
                                                 
72 Id. at 265; see also id. (“Several bishops, including Bishop John Kinney of St. Cloud, Minnesota, warned 
against denying a pro-choice candidate communion, and added that ‘no human is capable of judging 
someone else’s relationship with God.’”). 
73 Id. at 271. 
74 Bishops of Virginia (Bishop Paul Loverde and Bishop Francis DiLorenzo), The Voter’s Responsibility, 
35 ORIGINS 370, 371 (November 10, 2005) (emphasis added); see also note 9 supra (discussing the 
Catholic understanding of conscience); cf. Quinn, supra note 35, at 335 (“[N]or is it prudent for bishops to 
tell the Catholic people which among several candidates they should vote for.…The voting booth, like the 
confessional, admits only one person at a time.  There each of us stands before our conscience.  But not 
alone.  We hope that the charioteer of virtues, prudence, stands with us.”).  
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abortion decision.  Moreover, grave as the issue of abortion unarguably is, it is 
not the only very serious moral issue that demands the attention of the 
conscientious voter.  The “promotion of the common good in all its forms” is a 
value that is “not negotiable”75 as Catholics engage in the careful discernment 
that is required to make conscientious decisions regarding their participation in 
public life. 76
III. 
Now we are in a position to apply the principle of cooperation to the 
issues of abortion and the death penalty that might confront Catholic judges 
working in the contemporary American legal system.  What sorts of issues might 
                                                 
75 Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, supra note 2, at #83.  The Holy Father identified the following 
fundamental values as “not negotiable” in making public policy decisions: “respect for human life, its 
defense from conception to natural death, the family built upon marriage between a man and a woman, the 
freedom to educate one’s children, and the promotion of the common good in all its forms.”  Id.  Political 
decision making should be “inspired by values grounded in human nature,” and political decisions should 
be based on “a properly formed conscience.”  Id.  While these fundamental moral values are “not 
negotiable,” translating moral values into positive law in a pluralistic society is a complex endeavor.  
Indeed, deciding how best to promote fundamental moral values through civil legislation that will truly 
function as good law promoting the common good in all its forms under the concrete conditions of a given 
society demands the exercise of political prudence.  The necessary process of conscience formation is 
appropriately attentive to the limits of what it might be possible for the law to accomplish under existing 
social, political, and constitutional conditions.  See Lemmons, supra note 34, at 30-31; see also notes 34 & 
35 supra and accompanying text.  As John Paul II explained in Evangelium Vitae, 
 
when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, 
whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support 
proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative 
consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality.  This does not in fact represent 
an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil 
aspects. 
 
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 12, at #73; see also Finnis, supra note 12, at 109, 233 (discussing the 
meaning of Evangelium Vitae #73).    
76 See Heft, Abortion and Proportionate Reasons, supra note 1, at 273 (the “global common good is 
precisely what all thoughtful Catholics and especially US Catholics have an obligation to promote”); see 
also id., at 273 n. 36 (drawing a distinction between “a collective deed, such as the war in Iraq, which is an 
action of the US government and therefore directly and collectively implicates all US citizens” and 
“abortion which the government permits but does not perform”). 
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create a conflict between the judge’s oath to faithfully and impartially apply the  
Constitution and laws of the United States77 and that same judge’s moral 
obligation to be faithful to the demands of his or her religiously informed 
conscience?  This question will be considered in the context of the following 
three cases: 
1. Does a Supreme Court justice culpably cooperate with evil by voting to 
uphold the core principles of Roe v. Wade when presented with an opportunity to 
overrule Roe?  This was the situation faced by Justice Anthony Kennedy in the 
Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and this is the sort of 
situation that seemed to drive most of the discussion around John Roberts’ 
Catholicism during the debates that took place during the summer of 2005. 
2.  Does a state court trial judge culpably cooperate with evil if he issues 
an order authorizing a minor to obtain an abortion without involving her parents 
in a judicial bypass proceeding seeking to waive parental notification or consent 
requirements? 
3.  Does a judge who wants to be faithful to the Church’s teaching about 
the death penalty culpably cooperate with evil by participating in the judicial 
                                                 
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or 
affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I 
will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _____ under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  So help me God.”); see also Merz, supra note 25, at 309-10 
(“A judge is bound by his or her oath of office to enforce the law in every case.…The duty of the judge to 
follow the law is … a moral obligation, for the oath of office imposes a strong moral duty.”); cf. GRISEZ, 
supra note 46, at 882 (“[I]f something must be done to fulfill a responsibility flowing from a vocational 
commitment, there is a stronger reason to accept the bad side effects in doing it than if one could forgo the 
activity without slighting any such responsibility.”). 
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proceedings associated with capital punishment?  Justice Harry Blackmun 
declared toward the end of his time on the Supreme Court that he could no 
longer “tinker with the machinery of death.”78  Must a Catholic judge take the 
same stance?  Can a Catholic judge cooperate with the “machinery of death”? 
Case #1 
 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,79 the Court 
opened up some new space for abortion regulation, while reaffirming the core 
holding of Roe v. Wade.80  The constitutional law with respect to abortion after 
Casey has three central components: 1) prior to viability, women have a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest to make the decision to have an 
abortion.  2) Pre-viability regulation of abortion is unconstitutional if it places an 
undue burden on the woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.  3) After 
viability, the state is free to prohibit abortion, except where appropriate medical 
judgment deems the abortion to be necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.81
 Four members of the Court – Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, along 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist – were prepared in Casey to overrule Roe.  Two 
other members of the Court, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, wanted to retain the 
                                                 
78 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. . . . I feel morally and 
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.  It is virtually self-
evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the 
death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.”) 
79 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
80 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
81 505 U.S. at 878-79. 
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broad protection for the freedom to make the abortion decision that was drawn 
from Roe.  The outcome of the case was, therefore, determined by the remaining 
three justices – O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter – whose joint opinion now 
provides the controlling constitutional doctrine on abortion. 
 The joint opinion makes two points that are relevant to the topic of this 
Essay.  It first develops an argument that attempts to explain how constitutional 
protection for the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is supported by 
a line of precedents interpreting the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.82  This leads the authors of the joint opinion to conclude that, no 
matter what any of them might personally believe about the morality of abortion, 
the Constitution of the United States places limits on the government’s ability to 
regulate abortion.83  
The joint opinion then makes this interesting statement: even though 
Pennsylvania made weighty arguments that Roe should be overruled, “the 
reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are 
outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined 
with the force of stare decisis.”84  In plain English, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and 
Kennedy are saying that, even if we think Roe was wrongly decided, it is a 
                                                 
82 505 U.S. at 846-53 
83 505 U.S. at 850 (“Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of 
morality, but that cannot control our decision.  Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.”). 
84 505 U.S. at 853. 
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precedent that people have come to rely on in planning their lives,85 and if we 
overrule that precedent now we will do damage to both the rule of law and to 
the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.86
 There are good grounds to conclude that the arguments made by the joint 
opinion should be rejected as a matter of sound constitutional analysis.87  At the 
same time, however, it is wrong to conclude that a judge whose informed 
conscience tells him that abortion is a moral evil culpably cooperates in evil by 
taking the sort of position articulated in the joint opinion.  A judge could 
reasonably join the joint opinion because he sincerely (even if erroneously) 
concludes that the Constitution, when properly interpreted, does provide 
protection for the right to make the abortion decision.  Alternatively, a judge 
could join the joint opinion because he sincerely (even if erroneously) concludes 
that respect for the rule of law prevents him from voting to overrule the 
precedent established in Roe.   
 To conclude as a matter of constitutional law that a woman’s right to 
make the abortion decision must be protected does facilitate abortion by creating 
the conditions that allow abortions to take place.  If Roe were overruled, states 
would be free to prohibit more abortions, and some states would choose to do so.  
The judicial act of voting to maintain the central holding of Roe does, therefore, 
raise the issue of cooperation with evil.  But the judge reaching such a conclusion 
                                                 
85 505 U.S. at 855-56. 
86 505 U.S. at 869. 
87 See, e.g., 505 U.S. at 951-66 (Rehnquist, C.J.) and 505 U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J.) (criticizing the 
analysis of the joint opinion). 
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for the reasons just described does not necessarily share in the intent of a woman 
who chooses to have an abortion.  Accordingly, voting to uphold Roe does not 
constitute illicit formal cooperation.88  Moreover, voting to uphold Roe does not 
require anyone to engage in any immoral act; it does no more than say that the 
law cannot prohibit a particular sort of immoral act.  As Justice Scalia has said, “a 
judge . . .  bears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact.”89  
Deciding not to overrule Roe might, then, accurately be characterized as a form of 
nonculpable remote, material cooperation, which can be justified by the judge’s 
duty to be faithful to his oath to uphold the law as he understands it.90
Professor Douglas Kmiec explains that the Church does not instruct 
judges to make the law better if doing so would require them to act outside the 
proper bounds of their role as a judge.  Thus, Catholic justices do not have a 
                                                 
88 See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 249 (“[F]inding a law [prohibiting abortion] unconstitutional does not 
necessarily constitute formal cooperation in the evil that the law sought to avoid.  More generally, a judicial 
decision that determines the legal allocation of power is not necessarily formal cooperation in the sins of 
those to whom the law allocates power.”). 
89 Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Pew Forum Panel Discussion: A Call for Reckoning: Religion and the 
Death Penalty (Jan. 25, 2002), transcript available at 
http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php3.  
90 See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 255 (“[I]t is an important and good thing for judges to decide cases, 
including constitutional cases, according to law.).  But cf. Bruce Ledewitz, An Essay Concerning Judicial 
Resignation and Non-Cooperation in the Presence of Evil, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (“[F]or the judge 
who sees abortion and execution as murder, there is no persuasive excuse for cooperation.”).  Professor 
Ledewitz argues that a pro-life judge should resign rather than enforcing the law in a way that provides 
direct or indirect aid to abortion.  “The very fact that abortion is legal offers tremendous legitimation to 
abortion.… Thus, it may not be possible to remain a judge at all in a society that allows, and encourages, 
abortion.”  As Professor Hartnett notes, however, the Catholic judge’s refusal to participate in any abortion 
cases is unlikely to prevent the underlying wrong of abortion; “different judges will be brought in to decide 
the cases in accordance with the law.…Worse, if Catholic judges refuse to hear abortion cases because of 
the risk of material cooperation, their legal perspective on such issues will be lost to the courts.”  Hartnett, 
supra note 47, at 256. See also Lois G. Forer, The Role of Conscience in Judicial Decision-Making, in THE 
WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW & RELIGION (John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, 
eds.) 301 n. 35 (1988) (“I have refused to sit on cases in which the death penalty has been demanded.  The 
result has been the preservation of my own moral integrity at the price of submitting defendants to a court 
composed of ‘death qualified’ judges.”). 
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specific Catholic duty to use their power on the bench to restrain abortion.91  The 
judge’s duty is to use the tools of constitutional interpretation to ascertain how 
the Constitution deals with the question of abortion.  Professor Kmiec concludes 
that, “in ruling on . . . matters [of constitutional law], a judge does not become 
morally complicit in the underlying act [that the law might allow] or share i[n 
the] intent” of the actor engaged in constitutionally permitted, but wrongful, 
conduct.92     
 The same sort of cooperation analysis applies to the decisions of lower 
court judges who, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. 
Carhart,93 concluded that controlling precedent required them to declare 
                                                 
91 Douglas W. Kmiec, The Catholic Judge and Roe v. Wade (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story_17832_1.html.  But cf. Paulsen, supra note 29, at 37 (“[J]udges 
should never apply Roe or other pro-abortion law against conscience.  The moral imperative is to resist Roe 
through every legitimate means …. Where it is not possible for the judge honestly to avoid the rule of Roe, 
the judge should refuse to enforce Roe in any event, not through the subversion of the rule of law, but by 
challenging the Supreme Court’s clearly erroneous holding, by recusing himself in the particular case, or, if 
push comes to shove, by resigning.”).      
92 Douglas W. Kmiec, Catholic Judges, the U.S. Constitution and Natural Law (Interview with Catholic 
Online, Aug. 30, 2005) (copy on file with the author).  Bernard Häring seems to suggest a somewhat 
different analysis: 
 
A judge may frequently be confronted by the predicament of pronouncing “justice” or “right” 
according to an unjust law.  If by some legal provision he is permitted to withdraw from the case 
or is in some way able to avoid making the decision, he cannot be excused from the guilt of formal 
cooperation if he, nevertheless, decides the case.  Should this withdrawal be impossible, then we 
must hold that his act goes no further than his pronunciation that the law applies in this particular 
instance, a decision which can be viewed as only material cooperation. 
 
HÄRING, supra note 49, at 510.  The judge’s intent in pronouncing and applying the law, however, does not 
vary according to whether or not withdrawal is an option for the judge.  If the nature of the judge’s intent is 
the key to making the distinction between formal cooperation and material cooperation, the possibility of 
recusal in a given case shouldn’t convert a good intent into an intent that coincides with that of the 
wrongdoer.  It seems that Professor Kmiec has better captured the key distinction.  If the judge in issuing 
his decision intends that the underlying moral wrong be done, he is guilty of formal cooperation.  If he 
intends only to say what the law is, and the law allows a moral wrong to occur, the judicial act is better 
characterized as material cooperation, which might be justified by proportionate reasons.   
93 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 against a facial 
challenge to its constitutionality), rev’g Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, 435 F.3d 
1163 (9th Cir. 2006) and Carhart v. Ashcroft, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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unconstitutional the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.94  A judge 
whose ruling strikes down a law that would restrict some abortions because that 
judge reaches the legal conclusion that the law is unconstitutional is not morally 
complicit in the abortions that would have been prohibited by the 
unconstitutional law.95  The late Judge Richard Conway Casey of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York faced this situation in the case of 
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft.96
The plaintiffs in that case challenged the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban, which bans the procedure the Act defines as partial-birth abortion, unless 
the procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother. 97  Congress passed this 
law after the Supreme Court in 2000 struck down a similar Nebraska law in the 
case of Stenberg v. Carhart.98  The Stenberg Court held that the Nebraska law was 
unconstitutional, in part because it did not provide an exception allowing the 
procedure when it was necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve 
the health of the mother.  As a lower court judge, Judge Casey was bound to 
                                                 
94 18 U.S.C. §1531 (2004 ed., Supp. IV). 
95 I am assuming here that the judge sincerely believes that the conclusion he or she has reached is the 
proper legal conclusion as a matter of constitutional law. 
96 330 F. Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d sub nom. National Abortion Fed. v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 437 
(2d Cir. 2006), vacated, 2007 WL 1454322 (2d Cir. May 16, 2007) (noting that the plaintiffs conceded that 
Gonzales v. Carhart precluded relief on their facial challenge to the federal ban). 
97 “Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a parital-birth 
abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, 
or both.  This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a 
mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.” 18 U.S.C. §1531(a).  See 
also 18 U.S.C. §1531(b)(1) (defining the term “partial-birth abortion”).  
98 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg as the relevant precedent 
governing his analysis of the constitutionality of the new federal statute. 
Judge Casey ultimately concluded that there was no way to read Stenberg 
that would allow him to conclude that the federal statute was constitutional.  He 
closed his opinion enjoining enforcement of the statute with these words: 
While … lower courts may disagree with the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decisions, that does not free them from their constitutional 
duty to obey the Supreme Court’s rulings. . . . The Supreme Court in 
Stenberg informed us that this gruesome procedure may be outlawed only 
if there exists a medical consensus that there is no circumstance in which 
any woman could potentially benefit from it.  A division of medical 
opinion exists, [and] such a division means that the Constitution requires 
a health exception.  Stenberg obligates this Court . . . to defer to the 
expressed medical opinion of a significant body of medical authority. … 
Stenberg remains the law of the land.  Therefore, the Act is 
unconstitutional.99
 
Such a ruling did not make Judge Casey morally culpable for the law’s 
inability to prohibit a practice which his opinion describes in excruciating detail, 
and which his factual findings explicitly characterize as “a gruesome, brutal, 
barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure.”100  Judge Casey’s action is best 
characterized as remote, material cooperation that is justified by the 
proportionate reason of the judge’s duty to be faithful to his oath to uphold the 
law, which here includes an obligation to obey what the judge understood to be a 
                                                 
99 330 F. Supp.2d at 492-93.  The Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart noted that “Stenberg has been 
interpreted to leave no margin of error for legislatures to act in the face of medical uncertainty.”  127 S. Ct. 
at 1638.  The Carhart Court, however, rejected that reading of Stenberg: “The Act is not invalid on its face 
where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s 
health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”  Id. 
100 330 F. Supp.2d at 479; see also Hartnett, supra note 47, at 268 (noting that Judge Casey’s opinion 
helped to reduce the risk of scandal “by letting others know that cooperation does not imply approval”).  
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controlling Supreme Court precedent.101  As Professor Hartnett explains, “it 
would appear that in most abortion cases, a judge’s material cooperation is 
permissible, particularly if a judge takes steps to avoid scandal by letting others 
know that his or her legal decision does not imply approval of direct 
abortion.”102
Case #2   
 While a judge’s participation in most cases involving the issue of abortion 
can be understood as permissible material cooperation, the case of a judge called 
upon to preside over a judicial bypass proceeding where a minor is seeking 
authorization for an abortion without her parents’ involvement is different.  
More than forty states have statutes requiring that a parent be involved in their 
minor daughter’s decision to seek an abortion.103  Some states require parental 
consent, others require parental notification.  In order for a parental consent 
                                                 
101 For an argument that neither the demands of a hierarchical judicial system nor fidelity to the rule of law 
requires a lower court judge to enforce a “controlling” precedent that the judge concludes is lawless and 
immoral, see Paulsen, supra note 29, at 82-88 (urging lower court judges to “underrule” Roe by refusing to 
be bound by a lawless precedent).  “So long as the lower court may still be reversed by the higher court, 
there is no interference with either the ‘supremacy’ of the Supreme Court or the idea of the rule of law.”  
Id. at 84; see also id. at 85 (“[W]hile it may be thought a breach of decorum for an inferior court to 
repudiate a precedent of a superior tribunal, such conduct is not constitutionally insubordinate, and is surely 
not categorically improper.”).  Professor Paulsen explains that “[t]he conscientious lower court judge must 
not become an accomplice in [the] dirty work” of enforcing an ultra vires interpretation of the Constitution 
like Roe.  “It is possible, perhaps even likely, that a judge following this course will be reversed (and 
chastised) by a reviewing court, and directed to enter an order based on the unjust and unjustifiable 
precedent.…But when the source of the judge’s …dilemma is lawless judicial precedent rather than validly 
adopted positive law, the judge need not in the first instance follow the quasi-traditional path of criticism, 
recusal, and resignation, but should first undertake to underrule the lawless precedent.”  Id. at 88.  But cf. 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“Unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial 
system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided 
the judges of those courts may think it to be.”). 
102 Hartnett, supra note 47, at 257. 
103 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 966 n.1 (2006); Lauren 
Treadwell, Note, Informal Closing of the Bypass: Minors’ Petitions to Bypass Parental Consent for 
Abortion in an Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 869, 873 (2007). 
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statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute must allow a minor who 
does not wish to involve her parents in the decision to petition a judge to 
authorize the abortion without parental consent.104  The Wisconsin parental 
consent statute, for example, provides that, except in cases involving a medical 
emergency or other specified extenuating circumstances, a physician may not 
perform an abortion for a minor unless 1) the physician has received the informed 
written consent of one of the minor’s parents or 2) a court has granted a petition 
waiving the parental consent requirement.105  The statute further provides that 
the court “shall grant the petition” if the court after a confidential hearing finds 
either “that the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion 
decision on her own,” or “that the performance . . . of the abortion is in the 
minor’s best interest.”106
 A judge who believes that abortion is a moral evil and is called upon to 
preside over one of these parental involvement bypass hearings may indeed face 
a conflict between conscience and an act that he is required by the law to 
perform.  Unlike the judges called upon to interpret the Constitution in Case #1, 
the judge in Case #2 may be required by the law to issue an order authorizing a 
particular minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent.  Would the 
                                                 
104 See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997).  While the Supreme Court has yet to decide 
whether a judicial bypass option is constitutionally required in a statute that does not mandate parental 
consent, most parental notification statutes do include a judicial bypass option.  See Treadwell, supra note 
103, at 873 & n. 27. 
105 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(4). 
106 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(7)(c). 
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judge be morally complicit in the minor’s abortion if he or she issued such an 
order?107
Keep in mind that there are two grounds on which a judge might issue 
such an order.  If the judge issued an order authorizing the minor to obtain an 
abortion without the involvement of her parents on the ground that the abortion 
was in the best interest of the minor, the judge’s act is almost certainly best 
characterized as illicit formal cooperation.  “[A] determination that an abortion is 
in someone’s best interest constitutes a decision that an abortion should take 
place.”108  Thus, when issuing such an order, the judge presumably intends that 
minor should proceed to obtain the abortion.  To issue an order with this intent 
constitutes formal cooperation in the ensuing wrongful act of abortion.109
In contrast, a judge who issues an order authorizing an abortion without 
the involvement of the minor’s parents on the ground that the minor is mature 
enough to make the decision on her own may be involved in material, rather 
                                                 
107 The principle of cooperation also structures the analytical framework that applies to the question of 
whether or not an attorney who believes that abortion is a grave moral evil can licitly represent a minor in a 
parental involvement bypass hearing.  See Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: 
Client Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1354-59, 1359 (1997-1998) 
(concluding that a lawyer who believes abortion to be a grave moral evil cannot “argu[e] for a court order 
permitting a minor to consent to the performance of an abortion”); see also Indiana Planned Parenthood 
Affiliates Ass’n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1137 (7th Cir. 1983) (“we would certainly expect an attorney 
who [had strongly held religious or moral beliefs about the wrongfulness of abortion] not to accept a court 
appointment”); Theresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in 
Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1997) (criticizing an opinion of the Tennessee Board of 
Professional Responsibility suggesting that attorneys have an ethical duty to accept appointment to 
represent minors seeking abortions, even if such representation violates the attorney’s conscientious belief 
that abortion is a grave moral evil); Robert J. Muise, Note, Professional Responsibility for Catholic 
Lawyers: The Judgment of Conscience, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 786-94 (1996) (discussing the 
principle of cooperation as an analytical tool that provides guidance to Catholic lawyers making ethical 
decisions regarding the practice of law). 
108 Hartnett, supra note 47, at 250. 
109 Id. at 250-51. 
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than formal, cooperation in the abortion obtained by the minor.  The judge might 
intend only to apply the law faithfully; he or she does not necessarily issue the 
order with the intent that minor obtain the abortion.   Is the material cooperation 
involved in issuing such an order permissible?  
The material cooperation here is best characterized as proximate, not 
remote; the judge’s action here is much closer to an actual act of wrongdoing 
than is true in Case #1.  At the same time, it is still possible to separate the 
judge’s act of applying the law from the minor’s independent act of deciding 
whether to have the abortion or not.  If she decides to have the abortion, she 
would be misusing the freedom that the judge’s obligation to comply with the 
law gives her.  Still, in light of the temporal proximity that the order authorizing 
the abortion would have to the actual act of wrongdoing, the gravity of the 
wrongdoing that is being explicitly authorized by the judge, and the critical role 
played by the judge in making it possible for the minor to obtain the abortion,110 
it may be difficult to conclude that the judge’s act of material cooperation can be 
justified by a proportionate reason.  Under this analysis, judges who hold the 
conscientious conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil have strong reasons 
                                                 
110 Cf. Larry Cunningham, Can a Catholic Lawyer Represent a Minor Seeking a Judicial Bypass for an 
Abortion? A Moral and Canon Law Analysis, 44 J. CATHOLIC L. STUD. 379, 395 (2005) (“[A] lawyer who 
represents a particular minor in a judicial bypass proceeding would be a necessary cooperator to a specific 
abortion.  He is directly involved in the death of a particular fetus.”); id. at 397 (suggesting that it might be 
possible to argue that the lawyer’s assistance was not “necessary” to the abortion: “What is it that he is 
‘assisting’?  It is not the physical act of the death of the fetus, but instead the minor’s decision or ability to 
have the physical act performed.  His assistance is a step or two removed from the act, and is legal, not 
physical, in nature. … A lawyer’s assistance is not with the actual, physical procedure; it is with providing 
the opportunity for the physical act to occur.”).  
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to recuse themselves from judicial bypass proceedings in order to avoid culpable 
material cooperation in evil.111
Judges have in fact begun to opt out of these abortion petition cases on 
moral grounds.  In September of 2005, the New York Times reported that a 
Tennessee judge refused to hear a minor’s abortion petition case.112  The judge 
also announced that he would recuse himself from all such cases in the future.  
Judge John R. McCarroll of the Shelby County Circuit Court explained that he 
recused himself, because he believed that “[t]aking the life of an innocent human 
being is contrary to the moral order,” and he therefore “could not in good 
conscience make a finding that would allow the minor to proceed with the 
abortion.”113  In effect, Judge McCarroll was saying that his conscience made it 
impossible for him to follow the law that applied to the case.  Four of the other 
nine judges on the Shelby County court have made similar recusal decisions, and 
the Times report noted that judges in Alabama and Pennsylvania have also said 
they will not hear such cases.114
In response to Judge McCarroll’s announcement, twelve experts on 
judicial ethics wrote to the Tennessee Supreme Court describing his action as 
                                                 
111 See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 257. 
112 Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2005, at A21.  
113 Id. 
114 Liptak, supra note 112, at 21; see also Treadwell, supra note 103, at 870 (noting that there have been 
judicial recusals from bypass proceedings in Tennessee, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Alabama).  In 1993, 
an Ohio juvenile court judge declared that he would recuse himself from future judicial bypass proceedings 
after the county court of appeals urged him to stop hearing such cases on the ground that his repeated 
rejections of minors’ requests to waive Ohio’s parental notification requirement were the result of prejudice 
with respect to the abortion issue.  See Catherine Candisky, Twyford to Quit Ruling on Abortion Requests, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 23, 1993, at 2C.  
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“lawless.”  The letter explained that “unwillingness to follow the law is not a 
legitimate ground for recusal.”  The law professors’ letter asserted that Judge 
McCarroll’s only options were to enforce the law or resign from the bench.  One 
of the professors, Susan Koniak, said that “judges are free to express their moral 
disagreement with a law but [are] not free to decline to enforce [a law with which 
they disagree].  And one of Judge McCarroll’s colleagues in Shelby County had 
this to say, “I didn’t swear to uphold all of the laws of Tennessee except for X, Y, 
and Z.  [A judge] is sworn to uphold the law whether you agree with it or 
not.”115  As Professor Bruce Ledewitz notes, judges are expected to “take any 
case to which they happen to be assigned.… No provision is made for recusal in 
the case of particular laws regarded by the judge as immoral.”116  If a judge were 
to recuse himself because he believed the law was too evil to be enforced, the 
judge has failed to do his job.  Ledewitz concludes that resignation, not recusal 
“is the only form of non-cooperation open to a sitting judge.”117   
Judge McCarroll, however, argued that his recusal from these cases was 
both appropriate and required.  He noted that “[a] judge should recuse himself 
                                                 
115 Liptak, supra note 112, at 21.  The experts were contacted by Judge McCarroll’s colleague, Judge 
D’Army Bailey.  See D’Army Bailey, The Religious Commitments of Judicial Nominees – Address by 
Judge Bailey, 20 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (2006) (“If a judge could not 
enforce the law, then, as people have often had to do when they face matters of conscience, the judge 
should pay the price of his or her conscience.  The price of a judge’s conscience would be to step down 
from the bench.… I disagree with the proposition that a judge should have a blanket recusal in cases of this 
sort.”).  But see Hartnett, supra note 47, at 260-64 (arguing that resignation is “unnecessary overkill” unless 
the frequency of recusals results in an unfair burden on the judges to whom the cases are ultimately 
assigned; in this respect recusals on moral grounds are no different from recusals on other grounds). 
116 Ledewitz, supra note 88, at 32. 
117 Id. at 33.  Ledewitz proposes the adoption of a sort of judicial “conscience clause” that would allow 
judges to opt out of all death penalty and abortion cases.  This would allow judges with opposed to abortion 
and the death penalty to preserve their moral integrity and witness to the value of life by refusing to kill, 
without depriving the community entirely of their talent and wisdom in other cases.  Id. at 3, 33-34.  
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or herself if there is any doubt about the judge’s ability to preside impartially or 
if the judge’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned.”118  Judge McCarroll’s 
argument is persuasive: if a judge cannot in good conscience issue an order to 
which a minor seeking an abortion may be legally entitled, the judge cannot 
reach an impartial decision in the case and should recuse himself or herself.119      
Case #3 
         Does a judge who wants to be faithful to the Church’s teaching on the death 
penalty culpably cooperate with evil by participating in the judicial proceedings 
associated with capital punishment?  As the abortion cases just discussed 
suggest, this is a complex question because of the variety of roles that judges can 
                                                 
118 Liptak, supra note 112.  See also Pryor, supra note 41, at 361 (arguing that recusal allows the judge both 
to honor the law “by refusing to disobey it” and honor his conscience “by avoiding cooperation with evil”; 
“The judge cannot be impartial to his moral duty, and [the canons of judicial ethics] require[ ] a judge to 
‘disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.’ The law acknowledges that judges, in rare cases, should step aside.”). 
119 See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 259; Treadwell, supra note 103, at 875 (“If the judge’s moral beliefs 
about abortion are so embedded in his conscience that he cannot bring himself to neutrally apply the law, 
he should recuse himself from the case.”); id. at 877 (“Based on the current state of the law on judicial 
recusal, state court judges who recuse themselves from cases where minors petition the court for a waiver 
of the parental consent laws do not violate their ethical obligations as a member of the judiciary.  Rather, 
judges, who because of strongly held religious or moral beliefs about abortion cannot impartially apply the 
law, appropriately recuse themselves from such cases.”); Osborn, supra note 8, at 903 (“A judge who 
determines himself to be partial can disqualify himself under the Judicial Model Code.”).  As Judge G. 
Gary Tyack of the Franklin County (Ohio) Court of Appeals explained, “[T]he decision about whether or 
not to allow a young woman to terminate the pregnancy without parental notification should not simply 
reflect the preconceived notions of a given judge. … As a result, we strongly encourage any judge who 
cannot fairly and impartially consider these important issues to recuse himself or herself from involvement 
in such proceedings.”  Catherine Candisky, Judges Overrule Twyford, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 4, 
1993, at 1B (quoting Judge Tyack); but cf. Hon. Ann Crawford McClure, Richard Orsinger, and Robert H. 
Pemberton, A Guide to Proceedings Under the Texas Parental Notification Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 755, 801 (2000) (noting that, while the rules do allow for recusal “where constitutional grounds for 
disqualification or compelling grounds for recusal arose”, “there was at least some anecdotal evidence of 
legislative intent not to allow recusal …when bases solely on a judge’s views concerning abortion”); id. at 
801 n. 234 (“[R]ecusal should not be allowed because ‘this issue is not about the judge[’]s views on 
abortion[.]’” Instead, the only issue before the judge is “whether the minor proves the statutory grounds for 
waiver of notification.”) (quoting Report of the Special Subcommittee on Implementation of Family Code 
Chapter 33, Appendix F).   
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play in the legal proceedings surrounding capital punishment.  The cooperation 
analysis will depend on just what sort of role the judge is playing.   
 The Church does not teach that the death penalty is an intrinsic evil.  This 
makes imposition of the death penalty different from the intentional taking of 
innocent life involved in abortion.  The current Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, however, does insist that the death penalty can only be used when it is 
the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against an unjust 
aggressor.  When non-lethal means are available to protect people’s safety, the 
state should limit itself to using those non-lethal means, because they are more in 
keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in 
conformity with the dignity of the human person.  Under contemporary 
conditions in a developed country like the United States, society can be 
adequately protected by keeping criminals securely incarcerated. 120  In light of 
this teaching, it is difficult to imagine when the imposition of the death penalty 
could be characterized as a just punishment in the United States.  
 Thirty-eight states and the federal government, however, do authorize use 
of the death penalty in some cases.121  Can a judge who accepts the church’s 
teaching on the death penalty participate in judicial proceedings that will 
culminate in the imposition of an unjust penalty?  Can a Catholic judge cooperate 
                                                 
120 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH #2267 (citing John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 12, at 
#56). 
121 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 595 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that 12 states and 
the District of Columbia do not have the death penalty, while the remaining states and the federal 
government authorize the death penalty). 
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with the “machinery of death”?  Justice Scalia, who rejects the Church’s teaching 
on the death penalty,122 argues that Catholic judges who share the Church’s 
understanding of the death penalty should resign their office if they are unable to 
uphold the laws they are sworn to enforce.123
 A more carefully reasoned analysis of the problem is provided by Dean 
John Garvey and Professor Amy Coney Barrett in a 1998 Marquette Law Review 
article entitled, “Catholic Judges in Capital Cases.”124  They argue that Catholic 
judges who accept the teaching of the Church are morally precluded from 
enforcing the death penalty.  Determining whether this judgment of conscience 
will require the judge to recuse herself from participating in a capital case, 
however, will depend on the particular role that judge plays in the proceedings.  
For example, a judge who accepts the Church’s teaching should withdraw from 
any role that will require her to impose a sentence on a defendant in a death 
                                                 
122 See Scalia, supra note 30. 
123 Id. (“[I]n my view, the choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is resignation 
rather than simply ignoring duly enacted constitutional laws and sabotaging the death penalty.  He has after 
all, taken an oath to apply those laws, and has been given no power to supplant them with rules of his 
own.”).  Unlike Justice Scalia, U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz believes that the Church’s teaching 
on the death penalty is correct.  See Merz, supra note 25, at 311-13, 318.  At the same time, however, 
Magistrate Judge Merz concludes that he and other Catholic judges can in good conscience preside over 
death penalty cases: 
 
Because the prudential judgment about whether capital punishment remains necessary to defend 
innocent life is one about reasonable, moral people can differ, whether we shall have it or not 
should be left to the mechanism of democracy.  Where the legislature has made a different 
judgment from the pope, a Catholic can still be a conscientious judge and participate in capital 
cases. 
 
Id. at 318.  Magistrate Judge Merz does not, however, address the question of how a judge who himself or 
herself believes that the imposition of the death penalty is immoral and unjust can cooperate in the judicial 
proceedings leading to the imposition of the death penalty without doing damage to his or her own moral 
integrity.  The cooperation analysis discussed in this Essay provides a set of analytical tools for addressing 
that important question. 
124 John H. Garvey and Amy V. Coney [Barrett], Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQUETTE LAW 
REV. 303 (1998). 
 50
penalty case.  Dean Garvey and Professor Barrett argue that a judge who 
imposes a death sentence is engaged in formal cooperation with an unjust act.  
The judge who issues a sentencing order imposing the death penalty sets in 
motion a process in which the government is bound to execute the defendant 
unless there is an executive pardon.  The judge who issues the sentencing order 
intends that this execution should take place.  Accordingly, the judge here plays 
a role in an unjust act that amounts to formal cooperation, which is always 
prohibited.125
 In contrast, Garvey and Barrett argue that a judge could preside over the 
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence in a death penalty case, so long as the 
judge does not participate in the sentencing phase of the proceedings.126  The 
judge here would be engaged only in material cooperation in the death sentence 
that might or might not be imposed on a defendant found guilty at trial.  Would 
the judge have a proportionate reason that justifies such material cooperation?  
Garvey and Barrett argue that the judge would have a strong reason to preside 
over the trial on the issue of guilt.  Society needs judges to enforce the criminal 
law.  Such judges help maintain a peaceful and just society.  It is this social good 
that should be weighed against the harm of material cooperation.  The evil of 
capital punishment is grave – it amounts to the unjust taking of human life.  But 
the judge here does not actually participate in the sentencing, and does not know 
                                                 
125 Id. at 321-24.  But cf. Hartnett, supra note 47, at 242-46 (suggesting that, because a sentencing order 
might be understood not as permission to the executive to kill, rather than a command to kill, sentencing a 
defendant to death may not always amount to formal cooperation).  
126 Garvey & Barrett, supra note 124, at 324-25. 
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for certain that the death penalty will actually be imposed when the sentencing 
phase of the case takes place.  Recusal would not prevent the evil, because the 
judge would simply be replaced by another judge.  For these reasons, Garvey 
and Barrett conclude that the material cooperation in capital punishment 
provided by the judge’s participation in the guilt phase of the case is morally 
justified.127   
 The most difficult question of cooperation to analyze in the death penalty 
context might be faced by a judge reviewing a death sentence on direct appeal.128  
Such a judge may not intend that an execution take place; affirming the sentence 
simply means that the trial court has followed the law in imposing the death 
penalty.  The appellate judge, therefore, need not be characterized as 
intentionally directing or promoting the defendant’s execution in a way that 
amounts to illicit formal cooperation in the execution.  But affirming the sentence 
would be an act of material cooperation that allows the execution to go forward.  
Is the material cooperation involved in affirming the death sentence justified by a 
proportionate reason? 
Garvey and Barrett are unsure whether the judge should reach that 
conclusion.  Their uncertainty is rooted in their sense that most people would 
probably understand the act of affirming the death sentence as endorsement of 
death sentence.129  This raises the issue of scandal.  Moral theologian Germain 
                                                 
127 Id. at 325. 
128 Id. at 326-29. 
129 Id. at 328-29. 
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Grisez explains that “[s]ometimes the fact that ‘good’ people are involved [in a 
process that leads to wrongdoing] makes wrongdoing seem not so wrong and 
provides material for rationalization and self-deception by people tempted to 
undertake the same sort of wrong. . . . [O]ften the material cooperation of ‘good’ 
people in wrongdoing leads others to cooperate in it formally.”130  These 
considerations lead Garvey and Barrett to conclude that it is exceedingly difficult 
to pass general judgment on the morality of participating in the direct appellate 
review of capital sentencing.131  An appellate judge attentive to the potential for 
scandal involved in affirming a death sentence might, for example, effectively 
reduce the risk of scandal by writing an opinion that highlights the distinction 
between legal judgment and moral judgment and lets others know that 
“cooperation does not imply approval.”132
A Supreme Court justice like John Roberts, however, is not likely to be 
involved in this sort of direct appellate review of a particular capital sentence.  
The Supreme Court typically gets involved in the issue of the death penalty in a 
less direct way.  The Supreme Court may be asked to decide whether the lower 
court proceedings afforded the defendant all the procedural rights required by 
the Constitution, or whether the capital sentencing law enacted by Congress or a 
state legislature is consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment.  The questions here boil down to whether or not other 
                                                 
130 Id. at 329 (quoting GERMAIN GRISEZ, 3 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 
881 (1997)).  
131 Id.  
132 Hartnett, supra note 47, at 268. 
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political actors have made decisions that are authorized by the Constitution.  A 
Supreme Court justice might well conclude that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prevent Congress or a state legislature from enacting the death penalty.133  That 
conclusion of constitutional law is difficult to characterize as a moral 
endorsement of the legislature’s independent choice to in fact authorize use of 
the death penalty.  The judicial act of choosing not to undo the constitutionally 
authorized decision of another political actor is, therefore, a form of remote 
material cooperation that can be justified by the judge’s duty to faithfully 
interpret the Constitution and respect the division of authority established by the 
Constitution.134      
Conclusion 
 The conclusions proposed for each of the cases discussed in this Essay 
may well be open to reasonable debate.  One thing, however, should be clear: 
careful attention to the role being played by the judge in a given case is essential 
to an adequate analysis of the cooperation issue.  Contrary to Professor Turley’s 
suggestion, it is highly unlikely that a Supreme Court justice like John Roberts 
will find himself facing the sort of conflict between conscience and the 
Constitution that might require him to withdraw from participating in an 
abortion or death penalty case.   Indeed, trial judges – who may be required by 
the law to issue orders authorizing a minor’s abortion in a parental involvement 
                                                 
133 Garvey & Barrett, supra note 124, at 330. 
134 See id. at 331. 
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bypass hearing or enforcing the death penalty in the sentencing phase of a capital 
case – are more likely to face a conflict between conscience and the law that 
might demand recusal in order to avoid culpable cooperation with evil. 
In the end, the willingness of judges, legislators, and voters to wrestle 
with the question of cooperation is at least as important as the particular 
conclusions that any individual might reach in analyzing a particular case.  Much 
of the debate about the role of Catholics in public life has failed to address this 
complex issue with the nuance and careful attention to role distinctions that the 
long tradition of Catholic reflection on the principle of cooperation offers to us.135  
We should, therefore, attend to the question of cooperation with evil with 
conscientious care, because the principle of cooperation is not simply a matter of 
abstract theological speculation.  At the heart of the analysis that has developed 
around the principle of cooperation is the question of what sort of people we will 
become through our actions in the world.136  Those actions – including our 
actions in public life when we decide cases as judges and cast votes as legislators 
or as citizens – shape our characters, and thereby influence the kinds of people 
we will become.137   
                                                 
135 Cf. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Vive le Difference! Killing and Allowing to Die, 177 America 6, 12 
(1997) (“I end with a well-known aphorism: Qui bene distinguit bene cognoscit (the person who 
distinguishes well understands well).”). 
136 See M. Cathleen Kaveney, Tax Lawyers, Prophets and Pilgrims: A Response to Anthony Fisher, in 
COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (Helen Watt, ed., 2005), at 66; see also Häring, supra note 49, at 495 (“guilty cooperation above all 
violates Christian love of self”). 
137 See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 256 (“There is some risk to the judge from repeated material 
cooperation.”); id. at 268 (urging judges to “take care that the cumulative impact of material cooperation 
does not lead you to slide from material to formal cooperation or alter your fundamental [moral] 
commitment”); Ledewitz, supra note 88, at 3 (“The community should not command judges with moral 
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We could avoid some difficult questions by fleeing from participation in 
public life in an effort to insulate ourselves from any risk of ever cooperating in 
another person’s wrongful action.138  But this would be a serious mistake.  
Bernard Häring puts the issue clearly in focus: 
It might be very easy for one who has withdrawn from the world and who 
is concerned only with the salvation of his own soul to condemn with 
smug horror every species of material cooperation.  But one who “in the 
world” wills to be active for the kingdom of God and the salvation of 
those who are in spiritual jeopardy will view the matter in quite a 
different light.  He is faced with a serious problem.  Any hyper-rigorous 
stance respecting material cooperation … simply renders the exercise of 
the lay apostolate totally impossible.  Anyone who sets up in his moral 
code the rigid principle forbidding any action which might be perverted 
by others must, to cite but one example, renounce politics entirely.  He 
will be obliged to remain aloof from many significant areas of apostolic 
activity.139
 
 The gospel calls us to cooperate with God’s love at work in the world 
through the ways in which we live our daily lives in the world.  We respond to 
this call to cooperate with God’s love in the midst of the concrete demands of our 
lives as judges, legislators, lawyers, and voters.140  As we try to cooperate with 
God’s Spirit at work in a human community that is also marked by ambiguity 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualms to order abortions or sign death sentences.  If these judges obey, they have to that extent diminished 
their humanity.”). 
138 See Kaveny, Tax Lawyers, Prophets, and Pilgrims, supra note 136, at 69.  As Dean Garvey notes, “[W]e 
should not be too hasty to assume that our legal system is corrupt, and that the best way to defend our 
virtue is to steer clear of it.  The moral life is more complicated than that.”  John Garvey, Law & Morality: 
Divorce, the Death Penalty, and the Pope, COMMONWEAL 10, 12 (April 19, 2002). 
139 HÄRING, supra note 49, at 499-500. 
140 See, e.g., HÄRING, supra note 49, at 494 (“God has made us instruments and collaborators in the 
establishment of His kingdom of love.) Id. at 452 (Baptism “imparts to the Christian a grace-giving 
participation in the redemptive vocation of Christ so that in Christ and with Christ he cooperates in the 
salvation of the world.… He cooperates in a transformation of the arena of his life which redounds to the 
honor of God and the salvation of souls.”).  If we withdraw from the world “in order to be totally 
unblemished by the corruption of the great masses”, how can we “bear witness in the midst of the world to 
the divine love and cooperate in the fellowship of love reaching out to embrace all mankind?” Id. at 494.    
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and sin,141 we need to pay attention to these questions: Who are we becoming as 
people through the actions that form us as we strive to serve the common good 
in our varied public roles?  Are we becoming ever more faithful to our mission as 
disciples to be light and salt for the world,142 or does our cautious inaction in the 
face of the world’s needs itself increase scandal?143  My hope is that this Essay 
might offer some analytical tools to help us all attend more faithfully to these 
central questions of conscience.   
                                                 
141 See Kaveny, Tax Lawyers, Prophets, and Pilgrims, supra note 136, at 74-75. See also BERNARD HÄRING 
2 FREE & FAITHFUL IN CHRIST 479 (1979) (“[W]e all occasionally discover to our horror that what we have 
done with the best of intentions has been used by others to carry out their nefarious designs.  What 
conclusions does Catholic moral theology draw from this accidental tragic connection of good actions with 
the machinations of the spirit of darkness?  Surely we cannot withdraw to the point of missing our calling 
to be yeast in the dough, salt to the earth.”).  
142 HÄRING, 2 FREE & FAITHFUL IN CHRIST, supra n. 141, at 483 (“The discerning judgment will always 
take into account the mission of the disciples of Christ to be light and salt to the world.”); see Matthew 
5:13-16. 
143 As Häring explains, allowing a fear of causing scandal to cause us to withdraw from action in the world 
may itself risk infidelity to our mission to serve God’s Kingdom: 
 
It is a serious duty to take into consideration the weakness of another insofar as this redounds to 
the good of his soul and is within the bounds of sound reason.  However, we may not permit this 
concern for the frailty of others to divert us to a mode of action which in the long run would prove 
even more hazardous …. Nor may consideration for human frailty in others be carried to the 
extreme of jeopardizing our capacity for essential decisions and joyful effort for the Kingdom of 
God. 
 
HÄRING, supra n. 49, at 480 (emphasis added). 
